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Abstract	
In	 this	 paper	we	 seek	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 predictability	 of	 stock	market	 returns	 and	 explain	 the	
nature	of	 this	 return	predictability.	To	 this	end,	we	 introduce	 investors	with	different	 investment	
horizons	into	the	news‐driven,	analytic,	agent‐based	market	model	developed	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	
This	heterogeneous	 framework	enables	us	 to	 capture	dynamics	at	multiple	 timescales,	 expanding	
the	model’s	applications	and	improving	precision.	We	study	the	heterogeneous	model	theoretically	
and	 empirically	 to	 highlight	 essential	 mechanisms	 underlying	 certain	 market	 behaviors,	 such	 as	
transitions	 between	 bull‐	 and	 bear	markets	 and	 the	 self‐similar	 behavior	 of	 price	 changes.	 Most	
importantly,	 we	 apply	 this	 model	 to	 show	 that	 the	 stock	 market	 is	 nearly	 efficient	 on	 intraday	
timescales,	adjusting	quickly	to	incoming	news,	but	becomes	inefficient	on	longer	timescales,	where	
news	may	have	a	long‐lasting	nonlinear	impact	on	dynamics,	attributable	to	a	feedback	mechanism	
acting	over	these	horizons.	Then,	using	the	model,	we	design	algorithmic	strategies	that	utilize	news	
flow,	quantified	and	measured,	as	the	only	input	to	trade	on	market	return	forecasts	over	multiple	
horizons,	from	days	to	months.	The	backtested	results	suggest	that	the	return	is	predictable	to	the	
extent	that	successful	trading	strategies	can	be	constructed	to	harness	this	predictability.		
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Introduction	
The	integration	of	news	analytics	into	trading	strategies	continues	to	be	at	the	R&D	forefront	in	the	
investment	industry.	The	efforts	have	mainly	focused	on	constructing	early	indicators	for	a	change	
in	investor	sentiment	to	enable	a	trader	to	act	ahead	of	the	majority	of	investors.	The	potential	for	
success	 is	 therefore	 reliant	on	 the	 speed	and	precision	with	which	 information	 retrieval	 and	 text	
parsing	algorithms	process	vast	amounts	of	data	and	recognize,	 in	the	 incoming	 flow	of	news,	the	
events	that	may	move	prices	substantially.		
As	prices	generally	tend	to	quickly	reflect	new	information,	the	objective	of	news‐based	trading	
is	to	produce	short‐term	(intraday)	strategies.	On	short	timescales	prices	may	be	assumed	to	react	
to	news	linearly.	This	linearization	is	helpful	because	a	trade’s	sign	would	then	depend	only	on	the	
sign	 of	 sentiment	 assigned	 to	 a	 news	 item	 and	 its	 size	 on	 price	 sensitivity	 –	 each	 still	 being	 a	
formidable	 task.	 As	 with	 any	 other	 short‐term	 trading	 strategy,	 the	 downside	 here	 is	 a	 limited	
capacity	 and	high,	 turnover‐driven	 costs.	 Furthermore,	 should	 successful	 strategies	 eventually	 be	
developed	 –	 so	 far	 results	 have	 been	mixed	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge	 –	 competition	 in	 this	
segment	 will	 spur	 an	 “arms	 race”	 of	 speed,	 leading	 to	 increasingly	 fast	 price	 reaction	 to	 news,	
exacerbating	capacity	restrictions	and	reducing	profit	margins.1		
The	above‐described	approach	is	based	on	a	premise	that	financial	markets	need	a	finite	amount	
of	time	to	digest	news.	In	other	words,	return	prediction	using	news	analytics	relies	on	the	market’s	
informational	inefficiency	in	the	time	interval	where	prices	adjust	to	new	information.	Does	it	then	
follow	that	news	analytics	are	necessarily	useless	for	trading	over	longer	horizons?		
																																																													
1	For	example,	competition	among	high	frequency	trading	firms	has	increased	the	trade	execution	speed	
from	roughly	100	milliseconds	to	10	microseconds	over	the	last	decade.		
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At	 first	 glance,	 the	 answer	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 firm	 “yes”.	 Indeed,	 while	 it	 appears	 reasonable	 to	
suppose	 that	 a	market	 can	 “remember”,	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 reaction,	 previous	 events	 on	 the	 order	 of	
minutes	and	hours,	this	same	supposition	sounds	absurd	when	considering	periods	that	span	days,	
weeks	or	months.	Yet,	there	is	certain	empirical	evidence	of	long‐term	return	predictability.2			
It	might	be	useful	to	tackle	the	problem	from	a	different	angle	and	consider	whether	there	exist	
any	 logical	 possibilities	 for	 long‐term	 predictability.	 Incidentally,	 such	 a	 possibility	 does	 exist,	
provided	the	mechanism	of	price	formation	over	long	time	horizons	is	different	from	that	involved	
on	short	timescales.	Let	us	hypothesize	how	it	may	operate.		
Efficient	markets	ensure	that	new	information	is	manifested	in	a	change	in	market	price	shortly	
following	its	release.	However,	this	price	change	can	also	be	an	important	event	on	its	own	that	will	
draw	media	 response,	 which	 can	 incite	 subsequent	 price	 changes,	 causing	 in	 turn	 further	 news	
																																																													
2	There	 is	a	 large	body	of	research	 that	examines,	 typically	applying	regression	methods,	 the	predictive	
power	of	observable	variables,	such	as	the	dividend	yield	and	many	others;	see,	for	example,	Fama	and	French	
(1988,	1989),	Campbell	 and	Shiller	 (1988a,b),	Baker	and	Wurgler	 (2000),	Campbell	and	Thompson	 (2008),	
Cochrane	(2008).	However,	the	evidence	for	return	prediction	remains	inconclusive:	e.g.	Ferson	et	al.	(2003,	
2008),	Goyal	and	Welch	(2003,	2008).	The	model	of	market	dynamics	that	we	develop	here	is	fundamentally	
nonlinear,	 indicating	 that	 causal	 relations	 among	 the	 variables	 are	 substantially	 more	 complex	 than	
regression	 dependence.	 It	 follows	 that	 the	 standard	 approach	 to	 return	 prediction,	 based	 on	 regression	
methods,	 may	 be	 ill‐suited	 to	 capture	 this	 predictability;	 e.g.	 Novy‐Marx	 (2014)	 vividly	 pointed	 out	 this	
limitation	by	extending	stock	market	predictive	regressions	to	a	number	of	rather	implausible	variables,	such	
as	 sunspot	 activity	 and	 planetary	 motion.	 We	 propose	 an	 alternative	 approach	 that	 combines	 theoretical	
models	with	 empirical	 data	 to	 explore	whether	 stock	market	 returns	 can	 be	 predicted	 in	 an	 economically	
significant	manner.	
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releases	and	so	forth.	Thus,	the	original	event	may	trigger	a	“ripple	effect”	of	the	interlinked	price	
changes	 and	 news	 releases,	 unfolding	 over	 an	 extended	 time	 period.	 This	 implies	 that	 news	 can	
have	a	long‐lasting	impact	in	the	market,	arising	through	this	feedback	mechanism,3	which	is	absent	
on	short	timescales	as	we	will	see	later.		
Thus,	from	a	news‐price	system	with	no	feedback,	likely	valid	on	the	order	of	a	day	or	less,	we	
move	toward	a	mutually‐coupled	news‐price	system,	operating	over	longer	horizons.	Consequently,	
we	 must	 apply	 a	 different	 framework	 for	 return	 prediction.	 Whereas	 the	 short‐term	 prediction	
requires	fast	detection	of	the	news	releases	that	may	provoke	material	changes	 in	price,	 the	 long‐
term	prediction,	on	 the	contrary,	can	only	be	based	on	 the	regularity	of	 the	system’s	behavior.	 In	
other	words,	we	must	develop	a	dynamic	model	that	correctly	describes	interaction	between	news	
and	price.	Then,	provided	the	model	admits	non‐stochastic	solutions,	 it	would	be	enough	to	know	
the	market	position	 in	 the	news‐price	reference	 frame	 to	 forecast	 return	by	 following	 the	market	
evolution	path	provided	by	the	model.			
Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	proposed	such	a	model,	which	describes	stock	market	dynamics	in	terms	of	
the	 interaction	between	prices,	opinions	and	 information.	The	model	was	 formulated	as	an	 Ising‐
family	 agent‐based	 model4	with	 two	 types	 of	 interacting	 agents:	 investors,	 who	 invest	 or	 divest	
																																																													
3	The	idea	that	the	observations	of	price	changes	may	generate	a	feedback	loop	that	significantly	affects	
market	dynamics	 is	not	new	(see	a	review	by	Shiller,	2003).	However,	 its	application	for	return	forecasting,	
which	is	the	subject	of	the	present	work,	is	nontrivial	due	to	nonlinear	behaviors	induced	by	it.			
4	A	 family	 of	 models,	 named	 after	 Ising	 (1925),	 developed	 originally	 to	 explain	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
ferromagnetism	via	 the	 interaction	 of	discrete	 atomic	 spins	 in	 an	external	magnetic	 field	 and	 later	broadly	
applied	to	study	problems	in	social	and	economic	dynamics	(see	reviews	by	Castellano	et	al.,	2009;	Lux,	2009;	
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according	to	their	opinions,	and	analysts,	who	 interpret	news,	 form	opinions	and	channel	them	to	
investors.5	To	derive	 the	model	equations	 in	analytic	 form	and	 facilitate	 its	 study,	 it	was	assumed	
that	 investors	 made	 up	 a	 homogeneous	 group	 in	 which	 any	 two	 market	 participants	 interacted	
identically.	Despite	this	and	other	simplifications,	the	model	reproduced	the	price	path	and	return	
distribution	of	the	S&P	500	Index	within	reasonable	tolerance.	Based	on	these	results,	the	authors	
suggested	that	stock	market	returns	are	predictable,	but	did	not	conduct	tests	of	this	predictability	
as	their	model	was	still	too	coarse‐grained	to	produce	sufficiently	precise	forecasts.	
The	main	objective	of	the	present	work	is	to	design	a	model	with	 improved	forecast	precision	
and	apply	it	to	demonstrate	that	returns	can	be	predicted	over	time	horizons	longer	than	one	day.	
To	accomplish	this,	we	 introduce	heterogeneity	 into	Gusev’s	et	al.	 (2015)	 framework	by	replacing	
homogeneous	 investors	 with	 groups	 of	 investors	 that	 have	 different	 investment	 horizons.	 This	
enables	us	to	extract	characteristic	dynamics	on	different	timescales	and	produce	market	forecasts	
of	multiple	time	horizons,	upon	which	we	construct	trading	strategies.		
																																																																																																																																																																																																					
Slanina,	2014;	Sornette,	2014).	We	take	note	of	two	recent	works	that	share	common	ground	with	Gusev	et	al.	
(2015).	 First,	 Franke	 (2014),	 referencing	 Lux’s	 (1995)	 analytic	 stock	 market	 model,	 studied	 a	 generic	
sentiment‐driven	economic	model	with	feedback,	which	has	some	features	similar	to	those	found	in	Gusev	et	
al.	 (2015).	 Second,	 Carro	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 investigated	 the	 influence	 of	 exogenous	 information	 on	 sentiment	
dynamics	in	the	stock	market,	which	is	also	a	central	theme	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	
5	This	 approach	 contrasts	 with	 that	 of	 the	 established	 agent‐based	 financial	 models,	 where	 market	
dynamics	are	sought	 to	emerge,	primarily,	 through	the	 interaction	among	agents	pursuing	different	 trading	
strategies,	such	as	the	influential	work	by	Lux	and	Marchesi	(1999)	among	many	others.		
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Owing	 to	 this	heterogeneity,	 the	model	achieves	a	greater	explanatory	capacity	 that	 serves	 to	
highlight	certain	market	behaviors.	For	example,	 the	familiar	self‐similar	patterns	 in	price	returns	
on	different	timescales	can	be	explained	as	a	result	of	sentiment	dynamics	synchronization	across	
different	investor	groups	(Sections	2.1‐2.3);	the	transition	between	bull‐	and	bear	markets	is	shown	
to	occur	as	a	cascade,	whereby	groups	with	longer	investment	horizons	follow	groups	with	shorter	
horizons	from	one	sentiment	equilibrium	to	the	other	(Sections	2.1‐2.3);	and	it	is	demonstrated	that	
the	negligible	impact	of	price	feedback	in	the	intraday	dynamics	allows	sentiment	to	quickly	adjust	
to	incoming	news,	thereby	imposing	informational	efficiency	on	these	timescales	(Section	2.4).	
The	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 1	 describes	 the	 news‐driven	 market	 model	 with	
homogeneous	investors	and	develops	the	model	with	heterogeneous	investors.	Section	2	studies	the	
heterogeneous	model	analytically,	numerically	and	empirically.	Additionally,	Section	2.4	examines	
market	 efficiency	 on	 intraday	 timescales.	 Section	 3	 lays	 out	 the	 design	 and	 backtests	 the	 trading	
strategies.	 Section	 4	 further	 discusses	 the	 nature	 of	 return	 predictability.	 Section	 5	 provides	 a	
summary	of	conclusions.	
1.	Models	
This	section	 introduces	 the	model	with	homogeneous	 investors,	developed	 in	Gusev	et	al.	 (2015),	
and	using	it	as	a	starting	point,	derives	a	more	general	model	with	heterogeneous	investors	that	we	
will	apply	for	market	forecasting.		
1.1	Homogeneous	model	
The	model	 of	 stock	market	 dynamics	 in	Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 is	 formulated	 as	 a	 dynamical	 system	
governing	 the	 evolution	 of	 three	 independent	 variables:	market	 price	݌,	 investor	 sentiment	ݏ	and	
information	 flow	݄.	 It	was	obtained	by	defining,	based	on	observed	behaviors,	 interactions	among	
agents	 at	 a	 micro	 level	 and	 applying	 methods	 from	 statistical	 mechanics	 to	 produce	 dynamic	
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equations	for	averaged	variables	at	a	macro	level.	Before	exploring	the	equations,	it	may	be	helpful	
to	explain	the	proper	context	in	which	sentiment	and	information	are	used	in	the	model.	
Investor	 sentiment	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 summary	 view	 on	 future	 market	 performance,	 averaged	
across	the	 investment	community,	and	 is	determined	as	 the	ratio	of	 the	number	of	 investors	who	
opine	that	the	market	will	rise	minus	the	number	of	 investors	who	opine	that	the	market	will	 fall	
over	the	total	number	of	investors.	Thus,	sentiment	ݏ	can	vary	between	‐1	and	1.	By	this	definition	
sentiment	ݏ	encompasses	all	types	of	opinions,	irrespective	of	whether	an	opinion	has	been	formed	
rationally	or	irrationally.		
Information	 flow	 considered	 in	 the	model	 as	 relevant	 comprises	 publicly	 expressed	 opinions	
about	 the	direction	of	anticipated	market	movement.	 It	 is	quantified	similarly	 to	sentiment	as	 the	
ratio	of	the	number	of	news	items	with	positive	expectations	minus	the	number	of	news	items	with	
negative	expectations	over	the	total	number	of	relevant	news	items.	Like	sentiment,	information	݄	is	
bounded	 between	 ‐1	 and	 1.	 The	 fact	 that	݄	can	 be	 readily	 measured	 allows	 the	 model	 to	 be	
empirically	verified.6	
																																																													
6	Extensive	research	has	been	done	on	empirical	measures	of	sentiment	–	which	include	indices	based	on	
periodic	surveys	of	investor	opinion;	various	proxies	such	as	trading	volume,	call	vs.	put	contracts	and	others;	
and	applications	of	machine	learning	and	rule‐based	techniques	for	parsing	financial	news	and	social	media	
content	 –	 and	 on	 their	 correlation	with	 price	movement	 (e.g.	 Antweiler	 and	 Frank,	 2004;	 Brown	 and	 Cliff,	
2004;	 Baker	 and	Wurgler,	 2007;	 Das	 and	 Chen,	 2007;	 Tetlock,	 2007;	 Loughran	 and	McDonald,	 2011;	 Lux,	
2011;	 Da	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Alternatively,	 Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 suggested	 a	 rule‐based	 parsing	 methodology	 for	
measuring	݄	and	calculated	sentiment	ݏሺ݄ሻ	from	this	empirical	݄,	using	the	homogeneous	model	described	in	
this	section.		
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The	model	is	described	by	the	differential	equations:7	
݌ሶ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																																																																																																															ሺ1ܽሻ	
߬௦ݏሶ ൌ െݏ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																																	ሺ1ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߢଵ݌ሶ ൅ ߢଶߦ௧ሻ.																																																																																																																															ሺ1ܿሻ	
The	first	equation,	derived	by	observing	that	investors	tend	to	act	on	their	opinions	differently	
over	 short	 and	 long	horizons,	 establishes	 a	phenomenological	 relation	between	 the	 change	 in	 log	
price	 and	 investor	 sentiment.	 This	 equation	 states	 that	 price	 changes	 proportionally,	 first,	 to	 the	
change	in	sentiment	and,	second,	to	the	deviation	of	sentiment	from	a	certain	reference	level	ݏ∗.	The	
former	 is	 the	 main	 source	 of	 short‐term	 price	 variation,	 while	 the	 latter	 determines	 leading	
behavior	over	long‐term	horizons.	
The	second	and	third	equations	were	derived	together	as	a	single	system,	using	methods	from	
statistical	mechanics.	The	second	equation	describes	the	change	in	sentiment	due	to	the	 impact	of	
information	 flow	 on	 investors	 via	 the	 term	ߚଶ݄	and	 the	 interaction	 among	 investors	 via	 the	 term	
ߚଵݏ,	 where	߬௦	is	 the	 characteristic	 time	 of	 sentiment	 variation	 and	ߚଵ	determines	 the	 relative	
importance	of	the	herding	behavior	and	the	random	behavior	of	investors.	Information	flow	acts	as	
																																																													
7	Gusev	et	 al.	 (2015)	 (Eq.	13,	 Fig.	 12).	The	dot	denotes	 the	derivative	with	 respect	 to	 time.	Parameters	
ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߢଵ, ߢଶ, ߬௦, ߬௛	are	 positive,	while	ݏ∗	can	 take	 any	 sign.	 The	 parameter	 values,	 estimated	 using	 the	
empirical	data,	are	provided	in	Table	1	of	that	same	paper.	We	note	that	equation	(1b),	with	݄	as	an	exogenous	
variable,	was	originally	obtained	by	Suzuki	and	Kubo	(1968)	in	the	context	of	a	purely	statistical	mechanics	
problem.	
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a	force	that	moves	sentiment	away	from	equilibrium.	If	it	were	to	cease,	sentiment	would	come	to	
rest	at	a	nonzero	value	for	ߚଵ ൐ 1	(ordered	state)	or	at	zero	for	ߚଵ ൏ 1	(disordered	state).			
The	third	equation	states	 that	 the	change	 in	 information	 flow	 is	caused	by	exogenous	news	ߦ௧	
and	news	about	price	changes	݌ሶ ,	with	߬௛	being	the	characteristic	response	time.8		
Equations	 (1)	 form	a	 three‐dimensional	 nonlinear	dynamical	 system.	Each	point	 in	 the	phase	
space	ሺ݄, ݏ, ݌ሻ	represents	 a	 unique	 market	 state	 and	 each	 solution	൫݄ሺݐሻ, ݏሺݐሻ, ݌ሺݐሻ൯	represents	 a	
phase	trajectory	of	market	evolution.	This	evolution	is	driven	by	the	flow	of	exogenous	news	ߦ௧	that	
induces	random	fluctuations	of	the	phase	trajectory	and	by	the	feedback	mechanism	݄	‐>	ݏ	‐>	݌	‐>	݄	
that	generates	inertial	dynamics,	giving	rise	to	deterministic	behaviors.	It	follows	that	according	to	
this	model,	market	evolution	may	contain	deterministic	regimes	and	thus	be	potentially	predictable.		
Equations	(1)	were	obtained	under	a	simplifying	assumption	of	the	all‐to‐all	interaction	pattern	
among	agents.9	In	reality,	 interaction	among	 investors	 is	hardly	so	simple.	The	utilization	of	more	
sophisticated	patterns	of	 interaction	in	the	Ising‐type	models	 is	known	to	cause	the	emergence	of	
heterogeneous	 structures	 –	 in	 the	 present	 case,	 clusters	 of	 investors	with	 co‐aligned	 sentiments.	
Because	 the	 size	 of	 a	 cluster	 determines	 its	 reaction	 time	 to	 incoming	 information,	 this	
heterogeneity	can	generate	diverse	dynamics	involving	interactions	on	many	timescales.	It	follows	
that	model	(1)	should	be	regarded	as	a	coarse‐grained	approximation	that	determines	the	average	
																																																													
8	This	 form	 of	 the	 equation	 neglects	 the	 impact	 of	 direct	 interaction	 between	 the	 agents,	 omitting	 the	
terms	proportional	to	݄	and	ݏ	in	the	argument	of	the	hyperbolic	tangent	(Gusev	et	al.,	2015:	Eq.	12c).	
9	The	all‐to‐all	interaction	mode	is	the	leading‐order	approximation	for	a	general	interaction	topology	in	
this	model.		
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investor	 behavior	 evolving	 within	 a	 single	 timeframe	߬௦10.	 Thus,	 although	 this	 model	 provides	
certain	 valuable	 insights	 into	market	 dynamics,	 it	 is	 insufficiently	 realistic	 for	market	 forecasting	
(especially	over	periods	shorter	than	߬௦).	We	must	refine	this	model	to	improve	precision,	which	is	
the	subject	of	the	next	section.	
1.2	Heterogeneous	model	
We	wish	 to	 replace	 the	 above‐described	 framework,	where	 each	 investor	 interacts	with	 all	 other	
investors	 with	 the	 same	 strength,	 by	 a	 framework	 with	 a	 more	 realistic	 interaction	 pattern.	
Selecting	 such	 a	pattern	 in	 the	 form	of	 rules	 applicable	 to	 individual	 agents	 is	 a	hard	problem	 to	
solve.	This	is	because	there	exist	many	plausible	choices	for	interactions	at	the	micro‐level	and	the	
model’s	statistical	properties	will	be	sensitive	to	these	choices.11	Additionally,	it	would	be	difficult,	if	
at	all	possible,	to	derive	a	closed‐form	dynamical	system	for	the	evolution	of	macro‐level	variables	
based	on	the	interaction	patterns	more	complex	than	all‐to‐all.		
Instead,	it	may	be	more	practical	to	account	for	investor	heterogeneity	via	a	phenomenological	
approach.	As	discussed	above,	we	expect	that	realistic	interaction	patterns	would	produce	clusters	
of	 investors,	 each	 characterized	 by	 a	 specific	 (as	 a	 function	 of	 size)	 response	 time	 to	 incoming	
																																																													
10	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	estimated	߬௦	to	be	around	one	month.	
11	Cont	 and	 Bouchaud	 (2000)	 addressed	 heterogeneity	 in	 opinion	 formation	 as	 a	 topological	 problem	
within	the	framework	of	percolation	theory	from	chemistry	and	physics,	leading	to	the	emergence	of	clusters	
of	investors	with	shared	sentiment.	Following	this	work,	a	number	of	percolation	models	have	been	proposed	
that	replicate	some	of	distinctive	market	behaviors.	However,	as	mentioned	above,	the	results	are	sensitive	to	
the	choice	of	topology	in	a	model	and	it	is	difficult	to	economically	justify	any	one	particular	topology	choice.						
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information,	 which	 we	 can	 assume	 proportional	 to	 the	 investment	 time	 horizon.	 It	 is	 therefore	
sensible	to	select	the	investment	horizon	as	the	attribute	whereby	variability	is	introduced	into	the	
model.	Hence,	we	wish	 to	modify	model	 (1)	by	populating	 it	with	 the	 investors	 that	have	various	
investment	horizons.12	
Let	us	make	assumptions	on	how	these	investors	would	interact.	Presumably,	any	organization,	
whether	in	the	investment	industry	or	elsewhere,	should	tend	to	connect	best	with	its	peers,	owing	
to	shared	professional	interests.	For	example,	long‐term	investors,	such	as	pension	plans,	have	little	
in	common	with	wealth	management	companies	oriented	toward	mid‐term	performance	and	even	
less	so	with	the	day‐trading	community.	Each	of	these	investment	industry	segments	maintains	its	
own	 professional	 publications,	 conferences,	 seminars,	 awards	 and	 other	 platforms	 for	 discourse	
that	 promote	 networking	 and	 interaction.	 Therefore,	 we	 can	 suppose	 that	 interaction	within	 the	
networks	of	peers,	whom	we	propose	 to	 identify	with	respect	 to	 the	 investment	horizon,	 is	more	
efficient	than	across	them.		
We	have	thus	arrived	at	a	framework	where	investors	with	similar	horizons	form	peer	networks	
or	groups	within	which	 they	 interact	efficiently,	but	have	 little	 interaction	externally,	 at	 the	 same	
time	being	 impacted	 in	equal	measure	by	 information	flow	݄.	 In	the	 limiting	case,	we	can	assume,	
first,	 that	 the	 interaction	pattern	within	each	peer	group	 is	all‐to‐all	 and,	 second,	 that	 there	 is	no	
interaction	across	 these	groups.	This	enables	us	 to	 apply	 equations	 (1b,c)	 to	describe	 the	market	
with	ܰ	participating	peer	groups	as	follows:	
																																																													
12	Similarly,	the	average	memory	timespan	can	be	presumed	proportional	to	the	investment	time	horizon.	
We	note	that	the	agent‐based	market	model	developed	in	a	series	of	publications	by	Levy,	Levy	and	Solomon	
(see	Levy	et	al.,	2000)	includes	investors	with	different	memory	timespans.		
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߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																													ሺ2ܽሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߢଵ݌ሶ ൅ ߢଶߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																														ሺ2ܾሻ	
where	ݏ௜	is	 the	 average	 sentiment	 of	 the	݅‐th	 group,	 which	 having	 been	 normalized	 by	 the	 total	
number	of	 investors	 in	 the	group	takes	values	between	 ‐1	and	1,	and	߬௜	is	 its	 investment	horizon.	
Note	 that	 both	 the	 “herding”	 parameter	ߚଵ	and	 the	 constant	ߚଶ,	 which	 determines	 sensitivity	 to	
information	flow,	are	assumed	to	be	in	the	leading	order	uniform	across	the	groups.			
Next,	we	must	find	the	relation	between	ݏ௜	and	market	price.	The	sentiments	ݏ௜	sum	to	yield	the	
overall	market	sentiment	ݏ,	given	 in	a	general	 form	by	ݏ ൌ ∑ߙ௜ ݏ௜.	According	to	equation	(1a),	 the	
market	 sentiment	 influences	 the	 evolution	of	 the	market	price,	 so	 that	 the	 (unknown)	weights	ߙ௜	
determine	the	relative	contributions	of	different	investor	groups	to	price	movements.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	price	actually	changes	in	response	to	capital	flows.	Therefore,	we	can	try	to	deduce	ߙ௜	by	
considering	how	capital	flows	are	triggered	by	different	investor	groups	acting	on	their	sentiments.		
We	note	 that	Gusev	et	al.	 (2015)	derived	equation	 (1a)	by	proposing	 that	capital	 flows	 in	 the	
market	have	different	causes	on	different	timescales,	 i.e.	being	driven	by	݀ݏ	at	ݐ ≪ ߬௦	and	by	ݏ െ ݏ∗	
at	ݐ ≫ ߬௦,	 where	߬௦	has	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 average	memory	 timespan	 or	 the	 average	 investment	
horizon.13	Let	us	now	consider	the	݅‐th	network	of	investors,	characterized	by	the	horizon	߬௜,	on	the	
																																																													
13	The	basic	argument	is	as	follows:	Consider	an	investor	who	has	just	allocated	capital	to	the	market.	The	
following	 day,	 this	 investor	 is	 unlikely	 to	 amend	 her	 allocation	 unless	 her	 sentiment	 has	 changed.	 This	 is	
because	 the	 capital	 that	 the	 investor	has	 already	deployed	 reflects	 this	 same	 level	 of	 sentiment.	 Therefore,	
ignoring	external	constraints,	investment	allocations	can	be	presumed	to	be	driven	by	the	change	in	sentiment	
on	timescales	where	the	 investors’	memory	of	past	sentiment	 levels	persists	ሺݐ ≪ ߬௦ሻ.	Conversely,	on	 longer	
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timescales	ݐ	where	ݐ ≪ ߬௜.	In	this	regime,	݀ݏ௜	would	cause	the	capital	flow	݀ܿ௜~ܿ௜݀ݏ௜,	where	ܿ௜	is	the	
total	capital	managed	within	this	network.	
To	 estimate	ܿ௜,	 we	 note	 that	 all	 else	 being	 equal,	 a	 short‐term	 (high‐turnover)	 investment	
strategy	has	a	 lower	 capital	 capacity	due	 to	 liquidity	 constraints	 than	a	 long‐term	 (low‐turnover)	
strategy.	In	other	words,	liquidity	constraints	effectively	cap	ܿ௜	on	different	investment	horizons.	It	
is	 then	 reasonable	 to	 suppose	 that	ܿ௜	is	 generally	 an	 increasing	 function	 of	߬௜,	 i.e.	 the	 longer	 the	
horizon	the	more	capital	can	on	average	be	managed	with	no	material	price	impact.		
As	a	first	approximation,	we	can	assume	ܿ௜	to	be	proportional	to	߬௜.	This	choice	is	supported	by	
the	following	observation.	The	maximum	capital	amount	that	can	be	invested	or	divested	per	unit	of	
time	 without	 materially	 affecting	 price	 is	 determined	 by	 instantaneous	 liquidity	 and	 so,	 in	 the	
context	of	our	framework,	must	be	the	same	for	each	investor	group,	independent	of	its	investment	
horizon	߬௜	and	capital	under	management	ܿ௜.	This	amount	is	given	by	݀ܿ௜~ܿ௜݀ݏ௜	per	݀ݐ	or	by	 ሶܿ௜~ܿ௜ݏሶ௜	
in	the	limit	݀ݐ → 0.	Therefore,	we	expect	 ሶܿ௜~ ሶܿ௝	or	ܿ௜ݏሶ௜~ ௝ܿݏሶ௝	for	any	݅	and	݆.	This	can	be	satisfied	only	
if	ܿ௜~߬௜	because	ݏሶ௜~ 1 ߬௜⁄ 	as	follows	from	(2a).		
Thus,	we	 set	ܿ௜~߬௜	which	 yields	݀ܿ௜~߬௜݀ݏ௜	and	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ݏሶ௜.	 As	 described	 above,	 ሶܿ௜~1	since	ݏሶ௜~ 1 ߬௜⁄ .	
The	implication	is	that	the	longer	a	group’s	horizon,	the	more	money	it	manages,	but	the	slower	its	
sentiment	varies,	so	that	all	groups	cause	on	average	comparable	capital	flows	per	unit	of	time.	This	
																																																																																																																																																																																																					
timescales	ሺݐ ≫ ߬௦ሻ	investors	 would	 invest	 or	 divest	 depending	 on	 the	 level	 of	 sentiment	 itself	 since	 their	
previous	allocation	decisions	would	not	be	linked	in	their	memory	to	the	previous	levels	of	sentiment.	Since	
capital	flows	lead	to	price	changes,	these	two	asymptotic	views	can	be	superposed	to	yield	the	approximate	
price‐sentiment	relation	in	the	form	of	equation	(1a).	For	details,	see	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	(Section	1.3.1).	
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is	 sensible	because	otherwise	 some	 investors	would	 systematically	dominate	others,	which	 is	not	
observed	in	liquid	markets.		
To	conclude,	we	 assume	ܿ௜~߬௜	to	obtain	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ݏሶ௜	at	ݐ ≪ ߬௜.	 Similarly,	we	obtain	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ	at	
ݐ ≫ ߬௜.	We	superpose	the	asymptotic	relations	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ	and	because	the	change	in	
market	price	 is	determined	by	the	net	flow	of	capital	 into	or	out	of	the	market,	sum	across	all	݅	to	
derive	the	approximate	equation	of	price	formation	as	a	function	of	sentiment:		
݌ሶ ൌ ܽ෍ ሶܿ௜ ൌ ܽଵ ቆ
∑ ߬௜ݏሶ௜
∑ ߬௜ ቇ ൅ ܽଶ ቆ
∑ ߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ
∑ ߬௜ ቇ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																										ሺ3ሻ	
where	 the	 constants	ܽଵ	and	ܽଶ	are	 positive	 and	 the	 constant	ݏ∗	can	 be	 of	 any	 sign.	 Equation	 (3)	
contains	the	expressions	for	the	weights	ߙ௜,	 i.e.	ߙ௜ ൌ ߬௜ ∑ ߬௜⁄ ,	 implying	that	the	sentiments	ݏ௜	of	 the	
networks	with	various	߬௜	and	the	overall	sentiment	ݏ	in	the	market	are	related	by	the	formula:14		
ݏ ൌ ∑ ߬௜ݏ௜∑ ߬௜ 	.																																																																																																																																																																						ሺ4ሻ	
The	heterogeneous	market	model	is	then	given	by	the	dynamical	system:	
																																																													
14	This	equation	should	be	treated	as	an	average	relation	applicable	under	normal	market	conditions	or	
over	extended	time	periods.	In	particular,	it	is	not	expected	to	hold	during	spikes	in	trading	activity,	such	as	
those	accompanying	market	 crashes.	Additionally,	 it	may	not	be	 true	 for	groups	with	very	 long	 investment	
horizons	because	on	 the	corresponding	 timescales	effects	due	 to	the	 finite	 size	of	 the	market	can	affect	 the	
assumed	 linear	 dependence	 between	 the	 horizon	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 investment	 capital.	Nevertheless,	 as	 a	
first	approximation,	this	relation	will	prove	helpful	for	gaining	insight	into	market	dynamics	on	the	relevant	
timescales.			
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݌ሶ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																																																																																																															ሺ5ܽሻ	
߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																														ሺ5ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߢଵ݌ሶ ൅ ߢଶߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																															ሺ5ܿሻ	
where	the	aggregate	sentiment	ݏ	is	defined	by	(4).	
According	 to	 this	 dynamical	 system,	 investor	 groups	 with	 different	 investment	 horizons	
collectively	form	the	aggregate	sentiment	that	determines	the	market	price,	which	in	turn	influences	
the	information	flow	that	acts	on	all	groups	participating	in	the	market.	Although	there	is	no	direct	
interaction	among	the	groups,	each	continues	to	impact	the	others	by	eventually	contributing	to	the	
common	information	flow.	Thus,	the	information	flow	plays	a	dual	role:	it	is	a	force	that	impacts	the	
sentiments	of	different	investor	groups	and	also	a	link	through	which	these	sentiments	are	mutually	
coupled.		
Setting	ܰ ൌ 1	in	equations	(5)	recovers	equations	(1),	so	that	the	heterogeneous	model	studied	
here	encompasses,	as	a	particular	case,	the	homogeneous	model	of	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	Being	more	
general,	 system	 (5)	 possesses	 richer	 dynamics	 and	 reveals	 new	 behaviors	 stemming	 from	 the	
above‐described	indirect	interaction	among	the	investor	groups,	which	we	will	inspect	in	Section	2.	
2.	Study	of	heterogeneous	model	
This	 section	 studies	 the	 model	 with	 heterogeneous	 investors.	 Section	 2.1	 offers	 a	 preliminary	
analysis	 of	 the	 main	 effects	 expected	 in	 this	 model.	 Sections	 2.2	 and	 2.3	 investigate	 the	 model	
numerically,	using	direct	simulations	and	empirical	data,	respectively.	Section	2.4	applies	the	model	
to	demonstrate	that	the	efficient	market	regime	occurs	on	short	timescales.	The	relevant	technical	
details	are	in	Appendix	A.	
	
	Page	|	16		
	
2.1.	Preliminary	analysis:	key	effects	
We	 can	 substitute	݌ሶ 	from	 (5a)	 into	 (5c)	 to	 obtain	 a	 self‐contained	 dynamical	 system	 for	ݏ௜	and	݄.	
When	making	 this	 substitution,	we	 approximate	 the	 second	 term	 on	 the	 right‐hand	 side	 of	 (5a),	
which	describes	the	evolution	of	price	over	long‐term	horizons,	by	a	positive	constant	representing	
the	growth	rate	of	the	stock	market.15	We	obtain	the	following	equations:	
߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																													ሺ6ܽሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߛݏሶ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																											ሺ6ܾሻ	
where	ݏ ൌ ∑ఛ೔௦೔∑ ఛ೔ 		 in	 accordance	with	 (4),	ߜ	is	 a	 positive	 constant	 proportional	 to	 the	 stock	market	
growth	rate,	ߛ ൌ ߢଵܽଵ	and	ߢ	is	ߢଶ	renamed.		
Equations	(6)	define	a	dynamical	system	of	ܰ ൅ 1	mutually‐coupled	nonlinear	equations.	As	we	
will	 see	 later,	 this	 coupling	 leads	 to	 interesting,	 nontrivial	 behaviors	 in	 the	 system,	 such	 as	 the	
emergence	of	self‐sustained	oscillations	and	their	synchronization.		
To	develop	further	intuition	about	this	system,	we	express	it	in	the	following	approximate	form	
(see	Appendix	A):	
																																																													
15	Since	ݏ~∑߬௜ݏ௜	and	|ݏ௜| ൑ 1,	 the	 term	ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ	in	 (5a)	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 sentiment	 of	 long‐term	
investors,	that	is	ݏ௜	corresponding	to	large	߬௜.	Also,	equation	(5b)	implies	that	ݏ௜	varies	by	ܱሺ1ሻ	over	߬௜,	i.e.	the	
longer	the	investment	horizon,	the	slower	the	sentiment	variation.	Therefore,	ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ	contributes	to	price	
development	over	the	long	term,	e.g.	months	and	years,	which	enables	us	to	replace	it	in	the	leading	order	by	a	
constant	growth	rate.		
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߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൅ ܩሺݏ௜ሻݏሶ௜ ൅ ܷ݀
ሺݏ௜ሻ
݀ݏ௜ ൌ ܨ௜
௖ ൅ ܨ௘,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																									ሺ7ሻ	
where	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ,	ܩሺݏ௜ሻ,	ܨ௜௖	and	ܨ௘	are	given	by	equations	(A3),	(A4),	(A5)	and	(A6),	respectively.	
Equations	 (7)	 govern	 the	 motion	 of	ܰ	particles	 (oscillators),	 each	 representing	 a	 network	 of	
investors	characterized	by	horizon	߬௜,	driven	by	the	applied	force.	Interestingly,	as	follows	from	(7),	
߬௜	takes	on	a	meaning	of	the	mass	of	the	݅‐th	particle	in	the	sense	that	particles	with	small	߬௜	(“light”	
particles)	are	more	sensitive	to	any	force	than	particles	with	large	߬௜	(“heavy”	particles).	We	can	say	
that	particles	with	small	߬௜	have	smaller	inertia	than	particles	with	large	߬௜.		
The	form	of	equations	(7)	allows	their	interpretation	in	terms	of	the	particle’s	motion	inside	the	
potential	well	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	in	the	presence	of	damping	െܩݏሶ௜ ,	influenced	by	the	external	force	ܨ௜௖	stemming	
from	interaction	between	the	particles	(via	common	information	flow	݄)	and	the	external	force	ܨ௘	
due	to	the	flow	of	exogenous	news.		
As	follows	from	(A3),	the	shape	of	the	potential	well	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	is	identical	for	all	particles.	Further,	it	
depends	only	on	two	parameters,	ߚଵ	and	ߜ.	In	the	case	ܰ ൌ 1,	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	estimated	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1	
and	ߜ ൌ 0.03,	which	results	in	an	asymmetric	double‐well	shape	of	the	potential	(Figure	1).16			
																																																													
16	As	ߚଵ	increases,	the	potential	well	undergoes	a	bifurcation	from	a	single‐well	U‐shape	to	a	double‐well	
W‐shape	at	ߚଵ ൌ 1.	The	potential	is	symmetric	for	ߜ ൌ 0;	positive	ߜ	breaks	the	symmetry,	making	the	part	of	
the	well	where	sentiment	is	positive	deeper	and	the	part	where	sentiment	is	negative	more	shallow.	
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Figure	1:	 The	 profiles	 of	 the	 energy	 surface	 and	 the	 potential	 well	 corresponding	 to	ߚଵ ≳ 1	and	
0 ൏ ߜ ≪ 1.	(a)	The	energy	surface	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ	is	shown	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜	and	ݏሶ௜	in	the	space	ሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ܧሻ.	
The	 colors	 indicate	 energy	 levels,	 from	 low	 (blue)	 to	 high	 (red).	 (b)	 The	 potential	 well	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	is	
shown	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜.	The	equilibrium	point	at	the	cusp	of	the	potential	is	the	unstable	saddle,	
while	the	equilibrium	points	at	its	minima	can	be	stable	or	unstable	nodes	or	stable	or	unstable	foci,	
depending	on	the	magnitude	of	feedback	strength	ߛ.	The	part	of	the	well	where	sentiment	is	positive	
is	deeper	than	the	part	where	sentiment	is	negative	for	ߜ ൐ 0.	Three	typical	trajectories	are	shown	
schematically	in	the	well.	
Figure	 (1a)	 depicts	 a	 surface	 corresponding	 to	 the	 kinetic	 and	 potential	 energy	 of	 the	݅‐th	
particle	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜	and	ݏሶ௜:	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ ൌ ఛ೔ଶ ݏሶ௜ଶ ൅ ܷሺݏ௜ሻ.	Its	cross‐section	by	the	plane	ሺܧ, ݏ௜ሻ	gives	
the	 shape	 of	 the	 potential	well	 and	 by	 the	 plane	ሺܧ, ݏሶ௜ሻ	gives	 the	 familiar	 parabolic	 profile	 of	 the	
kinetic	energy.	All	trajectories	lie	on	this	energy	surface.	Figure	(1b)	depicts	typical	trajectories	that	
we	will	discuss	below.	
If	 the	 impacts	 of	 damping	ሺെܩݏሶ௜ሻ,	 interaction	ሺܨ௜௖ሻ	and	 news	ሺܨ௘ሻ	were	 negligible,	 a	 particle	
would	oscillate	periodically	in	response	to	the	restoring	force	െ ܷ݀ ݀ݏ௜⁄ 	along	the	energy	conserving	
trajectories,	given	by	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ ൌ constant,	on	horizontal	planes.			
Let	 us	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	 damping	 on	 a	 particle’s	 motion.	 Damping,	 if	 not	 counteracted,	
causes	 the	 particle	 to	 lose	 energy,	 so	 that	 its	 path	 spirals	 down	 toward	 either	 the	 negative	 or	
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positive	 stable	 equilibrium	 points	 located	 in	 the	minima	 of	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ.	Momentarily	 returning	 from	
this	 analogy	 to	 the	 real	world,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 interaction	 among	 investors	within	 each	peer	
group,	 subject	 to	 random	 idiosyncratic	 influences,	 compels	 the	group’s	 sentiment	 toward	either	a	
negative	or	positive	equilibrium,	where	the	consensus	of	opinion	will	be	reached.		
Price	 feedback	adds	a	 fascinating	twist	to	this	dynamic.	 It	 follows	from	(A4)	that	 the	damping	
coefficient	ܩ	is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 particle’s	 position	 and	 is	 also	 dependent	 on	 several	 parameters,	
most	 notably	 the	 feedback	 strength	ߛ.	 Interestingly,	ܩ	becomes	 negative	 in	 some	 regions	 on	 the	
ሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ‐plane	 for	ߛ	exceeding	 a	 certain	 critical	 value	 (equation	 A7),	 implying	 that	 for	 sufficiently	
strong	feedback,	damping	begins	to	supply	energy	to	the	system	instead	of	dissipating	it.	As	a	result,	
for	 large	ߛ,	 some	or	 all	 trajectories	may	 converge	 to	 the	 limit	 cycle	 orbit	where	 the	 supplied	 and	
dissipated	 energies	 compensate	 each	 other.	 This	 yields	 a	 potentially	 new	 state	 of	 dynamic	
equilibrium	 in	which	ݏ௜	would	 exhibit	 self‐sustaining,	 large‐amplitude,	 periodic	 oscillations	 above	
the	cusp	of	the	energy	surface	between	negative	and	positive	sentiment	values	(the	red	trajectory	in	
Figure	1b).		
The	critical	value	of		ߛ	is	roughly	the	same	for	all	ݏ௜	(equation	A9).	Therefore,	for	supercritical	ߛ,	
the	total	sentiment	would	undergo	the	limit	cycle	oscillations,	giving	rise	to	the	permanent	regime	
of	 rallies	 and	 crashes,	 which	 contradicts	 the	 observed	market	 behavior.	 Conversely,	 Gusev	 et	 al.	
(2015)	 showed	 for	 the	 case	ܰ ൌ 1	that	 subcritical	ߛ	leads	 to	 realistic	market	 regimes.	We	 should	
briefly	 inspect	 this	 case	 because	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 interaction	ሺܨ௜௖ሻ,	 the	 heterogeneous	 model	
ሺܰ ൐ 1ሻ	is	qualitatively	similar	to	the	homogeneous	model	ሺܰ ൌ 1ሻ	under	the	approximation	(7).		
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The	case	ܰ ൌ 1	offers	a	simple	portrait	of	trajectories	as	numerical	solutions	to	equations	(6)	for	
ߦ௧ ൌ 0	on	the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	(Figure	2a).	The	distinct	regimes	illustrated	schematically	 in	Figure	(1b)	
in	 the	ሺݏ, ݏሶሻ‐space	 are	 clearly	 visible	 here.17	First,	 there	 are	 small‐amplitude,	 decaying	 oscillations	
around	the	positive	equilibrium	point	inside	the	deep	well.	Second,	there	are	large‐scale	trajectories	
passing	above	the	cusp	of	the	potential,	along	which	the	particle	can	escape	from	one	well	into	the	
other.	Third,	oscillations	also	occur	inside	the	shallow	well,	where	sentiment	is	negative,	but	as	the	
equilibrium	point	there	is	unstable,	the	particle	is	quickly	ejected	onto	the	trajectories	leading	into	
the	well	 in	which	 sentiment	 is	 positive.	 Figure	 (2b),	which	 depicts	 the	 empirical	 sentiment	 path	
traced	 by	 the	 US	 stock	market	 during	 1995‐2015,	 confirms	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 above‐described	
three	types	of	sentiment	motion.		
Thus,	we	can	presume	that	subcritical	ߛ	permits	realistic	trajectories	of	sentiment	evolution	and	
so	will	apply	subcritical	values	of	ߛ	in	the	numerical	and	empirical	analyses	in	the	next	sections.		
	
Figure	2:	 (a)	The	phase	portrait	on	the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	for	the	homogeneous	model	ሺܰ ൌ 1ሻ,	showing	
an	 unstable	 focus	 in	 the	 negative‐sentiment	 well	 (red	 asterisk),	 a	 stable	 focus	 in	 the	 positive‐
sentiment	well	 (green	 asterisk)	 and	 large‐scale	 trajectories	 crossing	 the	wells	 (from	Gusev	 et	 al.,	
																																																													
17	The	motion	on	the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	bears	resemblance	to	the	motion	on	the	ሺݏ, ݏሶሻ‐plane.		
	Page	|	21		
	
2015).	(b)	The	phase	portrait	of	the	empirical	market	sentiment	trajectory	(1995‐2015).	To	make	
this	plot,	the	empirical	time	series	of	daily	݄ሺݐሻ	and	ݏሺ݄ሺݐሻሻ	have	been	obtained	for	ܰ ൌ 1	using	the	
methodology	 outlined	 in	 Section	 2.3	 and	 then	 smoothed	 by	 a	 Fourier	 filter,	 removing	 harmonics	
with	periods	 less	 than	100	business	days.	This	path	remained	predominantly	 in	 the	positive	well,	
with	only	two	excursions	into	the	negative	well	during	the	bear	markets	of	2001‐2002	and	2008.	
Next,	we	 examine	 the	 influence	of	 the	 stochastic	 force	ܨ௘	generated	by	 the	 flow	of	 exogenous	
news	 (equation	A6).	This	 force	acts	 to	 thrust	a	particle	 randomly	 from	one	 trajectory	 to	 another,	
occasionally	forcing	it	into	a	region	which	can	lend	the	particle	new	dynamics,	e.g.	from	the	vicinity	
of	the	equilibrium	points	to	the	large‐scale	trajectories	that	traverse	the	well	and	vice	versa.	Thus,	
exogenous	news	flow	plays	a	key	role	in	market	dynamics,	being	a	random	external	force	that	may,	
from	time	to	time,	trigger	changes	in	market	regimes.	Note	that	the	asymmetry	of	the	energy	surface	
implies	 that	 a	 stronger	 force	 is	 needed	 to	 move	 a	 particle	 onto	 a	 path	 crossing	 from	 the	 deep	
(positive)	well	to	the	shallow	(negative)	well.	
Additionally,	owing	to	their	 lower	 inertia,	 “light”	particles	with	small	߬௜	react	more	strongly	to	
ܨ௘	than	 “heavy”	 particles	 with	 large	߬௜.	 As	 a	 result,	 “light”	 particles	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 appear	
frequently	on	large‐scale	trajectories	high	on	the	energy	surface,	while	“heavy”	particles	are	likely	to	
spend	most	of	their	time	orbiting	the	equilibrium	points	at	its	bottom	(Figure	1b).18	This	situation	is	
relevant	 for	 the	 stock	market	 since	 a	 greater	 volatility	 in	 sentiment	 is	 expected	 from	 short‐term	
investors	than	from	long‐term	investors.		
																																																													
18	This	analysis	is	relevant	for	the	particles	with	߬௜ ≳ ߬௛.	In	Section	2.4	we	will	show	that	the	“ultra‐light”	
particles	with	߬௜ ≪ ߬௛	possess	no	intrinsic	dynamics,	adjusting	instead	to	the	dynamics	of	“heavier”	particles.	
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Finally,	 there	are	effects	due	 to	 the	 force	ܨ௜௖	exerted	on	 the	݅‐th	particle	by	 the	other	particles	
(equation	A5).	Its	action	can	be	viewed	through	the	prism	of	constraints	imposed	on	the	motion	by	
the	 relations	between	each	pair	of	particles	 in	 terms	of	 their	mutual	positions	and	velocities	 that	
restrict	the	degrees	of	freedom	of	the	motion.				
We	can	write	down	equations	for	these	constraints	by	observing	that	according	to	equation	(6a)	
at	 any	 time	 all	 particles	 must	 share	 the	 same	݄	when	 moving	 along	 their	 paths	 on	 the	 energy	
surface.	Accordingly,	we	invert	(6a)	to	express	݄	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜	and	ݏሶ௜	and	obtain	an	equation	for	
the	constraint	 ௜݂௝	between	the	݅‐th	and	݆‐th	particles:19		
௜݂௝ ൌ ݂൫ݏ௜, ݏሶ௜; ݏ௝, ݏሶ௝൯ ൌ arctanh
ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻ െ ߚଵݏ௜
arctanh൫ݏ௝ ൅ ௝߬ݏሶ௝൯ െ ߚଵݏ௝ ൌ 1,				݅ ൌ 1, 2,… ,ܰ,				݆ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܰ.																											ሺ8ሻ	
Equations	 (8)	determine	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 sentiments	 and	 the	 rates	 of	 change	 in	 the	
sentiments	of	different	 investor	groups	due	to	mutual	 influences	exerted	by	these	groups	on	each	
other.	 These	 relations	 drive	 synchronization	 patterns,	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 sections,	 plausibly	
resulting	in	self‐similar	behaviors,	as	well	as	other	effects,	in	the	market.20		
Together,	 the	 above‐described	 forces	 generate	 diverse	 and	 complex	 dynamics.	 For	 example,	
“light”	particles	may	in	response	to	negative	news	migrate	from	higher	orbits	in	the	well	to	orbits	in	
																																																													
19	These	constraint	equations	constitute	ሺேିଵሻேଶ 	nontrivial	first	integrals	of	motion,	out	of	which	ܰ െ 1	are	
independent.	The	independent	first	 integrals	reduce	the	degrees	of	freedom	of	system	(7)	from	2ܰ	to	ܰ ൅ 1,	
which	matches	the	number	of	equations	in	the	dynamical	system	(6).	
20	Synchronization	is	ubiquitous	among	the	behaviors	of	interacting	nonlinear	oscillators:	e.g.	Pikovsky	et	
al.	(2001)	provide	an	in‐depth	treatment	of	various	synchronization	effects	in	coupled	oscillator	systems.		
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the	vicinity	of	the	negative	sentiment	equilibrium	at	the	well’s	bottom.	According	to	(8),	this	change	
in	 the	 dynamic	 of	 “light”	 particles	 will	 require	 that	 “heavy”	 particles	 adapt	 their	 motion	 to	
synchronize	frequencies	and	amplitudes.	Should	this	dynamic	persist,	“heavy”	particles,	which	make	
a	major	contribution	to	total	sentiment	(4),	may	cross	from	the	positive	well	into	the	negative	well,	
tipping	overall	sentiment	in	the	market	from	positive	to	negative	and,	as	a	result,	pressure	market	
price	 downward.	 We	 will	 encounter	 this	 scenario	 of	 a	 bear	 market	 transition	 in	 numerical	
simulations	and	empirical	analysis	in	the	next	sections.	
At	 this	 point,	 we	 wish	 to	 remind	 the	 reader	 of	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 section,	 that	 is,	 to	
develop	a	conceptual	understanding	of	the	dynamics	in	model	(6)	prior	to	submitting	it	to	the	brute	
force	 of	 numerical	 simulations.	 We	 have	 therefore	 severely	 truncated	 this	 model	 to	 isolate	 the	
forces	 acting	 on	 a	 particle	 (i.e.	 an	 investor	 group)	 in	 equation	 (7)	 and	 explored	 the	 dynamic	
stemming	 from	 each	 force	 separately.	 The	 intuition	 developed	 here	 will	 aid	 in	 untangling	 the	
dynamics	obtained	 in	 the	next	 sections,	with	 the	 caveat	 that	 these	 interpretations	 remain	 inexact	
because	a	specific	dynamic	of	a	particle,	strictly	speaking,	 can	neither	be	completely	attributed	to	
one	particular	force,	nor	considered	in	isolation	from	other	particles.			
2.2.	Numerical	simulations	
In	Sections	2.2‐2.3,	we	investigate	system	(6)	numerically	for	߬௜ ≳ ߬௛,	while	the	case	where	߬௜ ≪ ߬௛	
will	be	treated	in	Section	2.4.	We	use	the	estimate	߬௛~1	day,	which	is	consistent	with	the	behavior	
of	the	autocorrelation	of	empirical	݄ሺݐሻ,	measured	in	Section	2.3,	showing	a	fast	decay	of	“memory”	
effects	on	the	order	of	1‐3	business	days.		
We	 proceed,	 first,	 by	 considering	 only	 two	 groups	 of	 investors,	with	߬ଵ ൌ 1	business	 day	 and	
߬ଵହ ൌ 15	business	 days,	 to	 illustrate	 the	 effects	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 In	 terms	 of	
oscillator	dynamics,	the	groups	with	߬ଵ	and	߬ଵହ	behave,	respectively,	as	“light”	and	“heavy”	particles	
on	the	energy	surface.		
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Figure	3	depicts	 one	 simulation	 spanning	700	business	days.	The	 “light”	particle	undergoes	 a	
large‐scale	motion	high	in	the	potential	well,	covering	the	distance	between	extreme	negative	and	
extreme	 positive	 sentiment	 values	 in	 a	 1‐2	 week	 timeframe.	 However,	 this	 particle	 can	 also	 get	
caught	 in	 a	 small‐scale	 motion	 around	 the	 equilibrium	 points	 at	 the	 well’s	 bottom,	 sometimes	
staying	there	for	extended	periods	of	time	before	it	can	escape	(e.g.	the	intervals	120‐170	days	and	
250‐290	days	in	the	positive	well	and	the	intervals	290‐440	days	and	610‐690	days	in	the	negative	
well).	As	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	these	transitions	between	large‐	and	small‐scale	motions	
are	triggered	by	the	stochastic	force	exerted	by	exogenous	news	flow	ߢߦ௧.21		
	
Figure	 3:	 Sentiment	 evolution	 in	 the	 two‐component	 theoretical	 model	 with	߬௜ ൌ 1,	 15.	 Other	
parameters:	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0,	ߜ ൌ 0.02,	߬௛ ൌ 1,	ߛ ൌ 5.		
The	“heavy”	particle	stays	on	the	orbits	near	the	bottom	of	the	positive	well	during	the	first	300	
days.	Its	motion	is	correlated	with	the	motion	of	the	“light”	particle,	such	that	its	path	shifts	toward	
																																																													
21	On	daily	intervals,	ߦ௧	is	modeled	as	normally‐distributed	white	noise	with	zero	mean	and	unit	variance.	
However,	we	have	chosen	ߦ௧	to	have	a	small	positive	 intraday	autocorrelation	on	 the	assumption	 that	news	
events	are	positively	correlated	on	 intraday	 time	 intervals;	 the	autocorrelation	 is	 zero	over	 the	 intervals	of	
one	day	or	longer.		
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negative	or	positive	values	when	the	“light”	particle	is	in	the	negative	or	positive	sentiment	region,	
respectively.	Equation	(8)	attributes	this	behavior	to	the	synchronization	of	the	particles’	dynamics.	
As	 a	 result,	 by	 observing	 the	motion	 of	 one	particle,	we	 can	deduce	 the	motion	of	 the	 other.	 For	
example,	when	the	“light”	particle	remains	sufficiently	long	as	the	solitary	particle	inside	a	well,	the	
“heavy”	particle	will	move	from	the	well	where	it	resides	into	the	well	in	which	the	“light”	particle	is	
residing.	Indeed,	we	observe	that	the	“heavy”	particle	follows	the	“light”	particle	 into	the	negative	
well	 in	 the	 interval	 300‐400	 days.	 Visually	 it	 appears	 as	 if	 the	 “light”	 particle	 pulls	 the	 “heavy”	
particle	 across	 the	 wells.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 this	 is	 the	 basic	 characteristic	 of	 the	 cascade	
mechanism	governing	regime	transitions	between	bull‐	and	bear	markets.				
Let	us	discuss	the	results	of	simulations	in	a	more	realistic	model	that	consists	of	nine	investor	
groups	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28	business	days,	which	will	be	applied	to	design	trading	
strategies	 in	Section	3.	 Figure	4	 shows	 sentiment	evolution	 for	 four	groups	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	3,	11,	19.	
The	synchronicity	among	these	groups	is	evident.	For	example,	in	the	interval	750‐800	days	we	can	
observe	how	the	move	of	the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	1	from	the	negative	to	positive	well	causes	a	similar	
move	of	 the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	3,	 followed	by	 the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	4	and	 then	the	rest	of	 the	groups,	
each	with	 progressively	 smaller	 amplitude.	 Thus,	 it	 appears	 that	 regime	 transitions	 occur	 as	 the	
cascades	propagating	from	“light”	investors	with	small	߬௜	toward	“heavy”	investors	with	large	߬௜.22		
																																																													
22	In	this	paper	we	do	not	consider	the	effect	of	a	slowly	varying	ߚଵ	on	regime	transitions,	studied	in	detail	
by	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	for	ܰ ൌ 1.	These	authors	showed	that	ߚଵ	slightly	increased	during	the	bull	markets	and	
slightly	decreased	during	the	bear	markets	(while	remaining	above	unity),	affecting	the	shape	of	the	potential	
well	and,	therefore,	the	probability	of	regime	transitions.		
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Figure	4:	Sentiment	evolution	in	the	nine‐component	theoretical	model	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	
19,	24,	28.	Other	parameters:	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0,	ߜ ൌ 0.02,	߬௛ ൌ 1,	ߛ ൌ 10.		
Another	 pattern	 discernable	 in	 this	 figure	 is	 that	 the	 particles	 form	 two	 groups	with	 distinct	
dynamics:	the	first	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	3	that	follows	a	typical	“light”	particle	dynamic	and	the	second	
group	 with	߬௜ ൌ	11,	 19	 that	 behaves	 like	 a	 typical	 “heavy”	 particle.	 This	 separation	 implies	 a	
relatively	 sharp	 transition	 between	 the	 two	 dynamics	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 investment	 horizon	߬௜.	
Therefore,	for	a	qualitative	analysis,	 it	seems	justified	to	approximate	interaction	in	the	market	as	
the	interaction	between	two	types	of	participants:	volatile	short‐term	investors	who	are	sensitive	to	
incoming	 information	 and	 relatively‐static	 long‐term	 investors	 whose	 views	 on	 the	 market	 are	
firmly	 established.	 Both	 groups	 are	 vital	 to	 market	 dynamics	 since	 the	 short‐term	 investors	 are	
sufficiently	 “nimble”	 to	 initiate	 a	 change	 in	 market	 regime,	 while	 the	 long‐term	 investors	 are	
sufficiently	“massive”	to	actually	effect	the	change.23	
	
	
																																																													
23	Incidentally,	 the	 behavior	 of	 these	 two	 investor	 groups	 resembles	 that	 of	 the	 two	 types	 of	 investors	
ubiquitous	in	the	market	modeling	literature:	fundamental	traders	and	systematic		traders.		
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2.3.	Empirical	application	
At	 this	 juncture	we	are	ready	 to	 test	 the	model	with	empirical	data.	For	 this	purpose,	we	wish	 to	
measure	݄	for	 a	 relevant	 market	 and	 then	 calculate	ݏ௜ሺ݄ሻ	and	݌ሺ݄ሻ	from	 equations	 5(b)	 and	 5(a),	
respectively.	We	choose	the	US	stock	market	as	the	object	for	this	empirical	study,	given	the	news	
volume	triggered	by	it,	and	select	the	S&P	500	Index	as	its	proxy.	
We	remind	the	reader	that	݄	has	been	defined	in	Section	1.1	as	the	ratio	of	the	number	of	news	
items	 with	 positive	 market	 return	 expectations	 minus	 the	 number	 of	 news	 items	 with	 negative	
market	return	expectations	over	the	total	number	of	relevant	news	items.	Thus,	our	objective	is	to	
capture	in	the	general	daily	news	flow	the	number	of	news	releases	that	provide	some	indication	of	
anticipated	 market	 movement:	 e.g.	 “…	 S&P	 500	 is	 likely	 to	 tumble	 amid	 worries	 over	 company	
profits…”	or	 “…	S&P	500	 is	expected	 to	rise	on	upbeat	 jobs	data…”.	We	consider	only	 the	English	
language	media	and	apply	a	rule‐based	parsing	methodology	outlined	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	to	daily	
news	data	for	the	period	1995‐2015	retrieved	from	DJ/Factiva	news	archive.	As	a	result,	we	obtain	
a	time	series	of	daily	݄ሺݐሻ	over	this	period	(Figure	5a).	24		
																																																													
24	A	more	detailed	discussion	about	 the	measurement	of	݄	can	be	 found	 in	Gusev	et	al.	 (2015).	We	only	
note	here	that	these	authors	proposed	to	treat	each	news	item	as	if	it	were	a	“sales	pitch”	aimed	at	investors	
to	buy	or	sell	 the	market.	This	allowed	 them	to	employ	 ideas	 from	marketing	 research	and	put	 forward	an	
argument	that	݄	–	information	patterns	that	explicitly	mention	the	direction	of	expected	market	movement	–	
impacts	investors	most.	In	practice,	news	about	current	and	recent	market	price	changes,	which	make	up	the	
bulk	of	the	study’s	relevant	news	volume,	can	also	influence	investors.	As	such,	this	information	is	included	in	
the	measurement	of	݄,	along	with	information	concerning	anticipated	market	movement.	
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To	calculate	sentiment,	we	use	the	nine‐component	model	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28	
business	days	and	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1	and	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0,	studied	above.	We	substitute	݄ሺݐሻ	into	the	corresponding	
equations	(5b),	solve	them	numerically	for	ݏ௜ሺݐሻ	and	then	obtain	total	empirical	sentiment	ݏሺݐሻ	from	
equation	(4)	(Figure	5b).		
Next,	we	apply	equation	(5a)	to	calculate	model	price	݌ሺݐሻ	from	ݏሺݐሻ.	To	do	that,	we	determine	
the	 coefficients	 in	 (5a)	 that	 minimize	 the	 mean‐square	 deviation	 between	݌ሺݐሻ	and	 the	 S&P	 500	
Index	log	prices.	The	resulting	empirical	model	price	݌ሺݐሻ	is	shown	in	Figure	5c.	
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Figure	5:	 Daily	 time	 series	 of	 information	݄ሺݐሻ,	 sentiment	ݏሺݐሻ	and	 price	݌ሺݐሻ	from	1995	 to	 2015.	
Sentiment	ݏሺݐሻ	has	been	calculated	from	measured	݄ሺݐሻ	using	the	nine‐component	model	(5b)	with	
fixed	parameters	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28,	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0.	Price	݌ሺݐሻ	has	been	calculated	
from	ݏሺݐሻ	using	 the	 price	 formation	 equation	 (5a)	with	ܽଵ ൌ 0.356,	ܽଶ ൌ 0.003,	ݏ∗ ൌ 0.153	and	 the	
integration	constant	equal	to	6.455,	estimated	by	least	squares	fitting.	
The	correlation	between	the	daily	model	prices	and	the	daily	index	log	prices	is	over	92%.	Thus,	
this	heterogeneous	model	fits	the	market	data	better	than	the	homogeneous	model	 in	Gusev	et	al.	
(2015),	which	is	83%	correlated	with	actual	prices.	Such	an	accurate	replication	of	the	market	price	
path	 is	encouraging	but	 it	cannot	resolve	whether	the	model	 is	predictive	or	not.	We	will	 test	 the	
predictability	in	Section	3,	using	trading	strategies	constructed	upon	this	model.	
Figure	6	shows	the	evolution	of	several	ݏ௜ሺݐሻ	for	the	period	2005‐2009,	chosen	to	highlight	the	
empirical	 behavior	 of	 sentiment	 during	 transition	 to‐	 and	 from	 the	 bear	 market	 regime.	 These	
results	are	visually	similar	to	the	results	of	numerical	simulation	in	Section	2.2.	We	particularly	note	
the	cascade	mechanism	of	the	market	regime	transitions	and	the	distinct	patterns	in	the	behavior	of	
the	 short‐term	and	 long‐term	 investor	groups,	 thus	corroborating	 the	main	 features	of	 the	model	
dynamics	empirically.	
	
Figure	6:	Sentiment	evolution	in	the	nine‐component	empirical	model	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	
24,	28.	Other	parameters:	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0.		
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2.4.	Efficient	market	regime	
In	 this	 section	we	 show	 that	 in	 the	 leading	 order	 the	dynamic	 of	 short‐term	 investors	 decouples	
from	the	dynamics	of	investor	groups	with	longer	horizons,	where	short‐term	investors	are	defined	
as	 traders	 operating	 on	 timescales	 much	 shorter	 than	߬௛~1	day.	 In	 particular,	 we	 will	 see	 that	
investment	processes	on	these	timescales	are	not	involved	in	the	feedback	mechanism,	but	instead	
cause	market	price	to	adjust	quickly	to	new	information,	contributing	to	market	efficiency.		
Let	us	consider	a	two‐component	25	system	(6)	such	that	߬ଵ ≪ ߬௛ ≲ ߬ଶ:	
߬ଵݏሶଵ ൌ െݏଵ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଵ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																											 ሺ9ܽሻ	
߬ଶݏሶଶ ൌ െݏଶ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଶ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																										ሺ9ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺ̅ߛሺ߬ଵݏሶଵ ൅ ߬ଶݏሶଶሻ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																			ሺ9ܿሻ	
where	̅ߛ ൌ ఊఛభାఛమ	.	
We	first	examine	this	system	on	timescales	~߬ଵ.	It	follows	from	(9a)	that	ݏଵ	can	change	by	ܱሺ1ሻ	
over	߬ଵ.	Similarly,	 (9b,c)	 imply	that	݄	and	ݏଶ	change	respectively	by	ܱ ቀఛభఛ೓ቁ ≪ 1	and	ܱ ቀ
ఛభ
ఛమቁ ≪ 1	over	
߬ଵ.	Such	a	slow	variation	in	݄	and	ݏଶ	can	in	the	first	order	be	neglected,	leading	to	
߬ଵݏሶଵ ൌ െݏଵ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଵ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																								 ሺ10ܽሻ	
ݏሶଶ ൌ 0,																																																																																																																																																																									ሺ10ܾሻ	
ሶ݄ ൌ 0.																																																																																																																																																																											ሺ10ܿሻ	
																																																													
25	This	result	holds	for	model	(6)	with	ܰ ൒ 2.	For	simplicity,	we	show	its	derivation	in	the	case	ܰ ൌ 2.	
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According	to	equations	(10),	both	݄	and	ݏଶ	remain	approximately	constant	on	timescales	~߬ଵ,	over	
which	ݏଵ	converges	from	any	initial	position	toward	its	equilibrium	state	(ݏሶଵ ൌ 0),	given	by	
ݏଵ ൌ tanhሺߚݏଵ ൅ ߚଵ݄ሻ. 																																																																																																																																											ሺ11ܽሻ	
Next,	we	study	system	(9)	on	timescales	~߬௛	or	longer.	As	viewed	on	these	timescales,	ݏଵ	almost	
instantaneously	(~߬ଵ ≪ ߬௛)	arrives	at	the	position	of	equilibrium	(11a).	Consequently,	sentiment	ݏଵ	
behaves	as	if	it	were	in	a	state	of	permanent	equilibrium,	while	݄	and	ݏଶ	evolve	according	to		
߬ଶݏሶଶ ൌ െݏଶ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଶ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																								ሺ11ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺ̅ߛ߬ଶݏሶଶ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ.																																																																																																																	ሺ11ܿሻ	
Therefore,	 system	dynamics	on	 these	 timescales	are	determined	by	equations	 (11b,c),	whereas	ݏଵ	
merely	follows	any	changes	in	݄	by	moving	along	the	equilibrium	solution	(11a),	which	is	called	the	
isocline.	26,27		
																																																													
26	Strictly	speaking,	although	ݏଵ	spends	most	of	its	time	(~߬௛)	on	the	isocline,	where	its	velocity	is	close	to	
zero,	it	can	also	leave	the	isocline	and	move	briefly	(~߬ଵ)	along	a	trajectory	in	its	vicinity	(Figure	7).	Therefore,	
ݏሶଵ	is	nearly	 zero	at	all	 times,	 except	 for	brief	moments	when	 the	 trajectory	departs	 the	 isocline,	 so	 that	 the	
average	contribution	in	(9c)	due	to	ݏଵ	is	small	as	compared	to	ݏଶ	and	can	be	neglected.		
27	This	approximation	does	not	work	in	a	system	with	ܰ ൌ 1,	as	there	exist	̅ߛ	for	which	the	term	̅ߛ߬ଵݏሶଵ	in	
(9c)	cannot	be	neglected.	As	a	result,	for	large	̅ߛ	the	coupling	between	ݏଵ	and	݄	can	be	strong	enough	to	cause	
a	limit	cycle	dynamic.	The	situation	is	different	in	systems	with	ܰ ൒ 2	that	simulate	market	dynamics	with	a	
greater	precision.	There,	߬ଵݏሶଵ	can	in	average	be	neglected	in	comparison	with	߬௜ݏሶ௜ 	(߬௜ ≳ ߬௛)	in	(9c),	so	that	the	
motion	of	ݏଵ	is	completely	determined	in	this	case	by	the	dynamics	between	݄	and	ݏ௜ஷଵ.			
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Figure	7:	The	isocline	(red)	and	trajectories	of	ݏଵ	(blue)	for	different	initial	conditions	in	system	(9)	
with	߬ଵ ൌ 0.01	and	߬ଶ ൌ 25	business	days.	Sentiment	ݏଵ	falls	on	the	isocline	along	the	approximately	
horizontal	lines:	the	motion	occurring	so	fast	that	݄	has	little	time	to	change.	Sentiment	ݏଵ	continues	
to	move	 along	 the	 isocline,	 following	 slowly	 evolving	݄.	 The	 segment	 of	 the	 isocline	 between	 its	
extrema	 is	 unstable,	 which	 causes	 sentiment	 to	 vacillate	 between	 the	 isocline’s	 left	 and	 right	
branches.	The	overall	motion	consists	of	slow	passages	along	the	isocline	and	fast	jumps	between	its	
branches,	determined	solely	by	the	dynamics	between	݄	and	ݏଶ.		
Thus,	 we	 have	 shown	 that	 sentiment	ݏଵ,	 which	 develops	 on	 timescales	߬ଵ ≪ 1	day,	 decouples	
from	 the	 system’s	 dynamics	 and	 does	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 sentiment‐information	 feedback;	
instead,	 sentiment	ݏଵ	resides	 in	 a	 state	 of	 approximate	 equilibrium,	 adjusting	 instantaneously	 to	
changes	in	information	flow	݄	and	so	driving	corresponding	changes	in	market	price.28	We	therefore	
conclude	 that	 market	 efficiency	 persists	 on	 timescales	 much	 less	 than	 one	 day.	 Further,	 we	 can	
																																																													
28	This	analytical	result,	which	follows	from	equations	(10)	and	(11),	was	also	verified	by	direct	numerical	
simulations.	In	addition,	we	note	that	equations	(10)	and	(11)	can	be	obtained	by	rescaling	system	(9)	using	a	
dimensionless	 time	variable	and	 then	 inspecting	 the	 leading‐order	balance	on	relevant	 timescales;	we	have	
chosen	an	informal	derivation	above	for	the	sake	of	preserving	the	readability	of	this	section.	
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reasonably	conjecture	that	intraday	investment	processes,	generally,	take	place	in	a	quasi‐efficient	
market	 regime	 due	 to	weak	 feedback,	 gradually	 giving	way	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	mutually	 coupled	
information	and	sentiment	over	horizons	longer	than	one	day,	which	we	study	in	this	paper.		
3.	News‐based	trading	strategies	
The	previous	section	concluded	that	the	stock	market	is	efficient	on	short	timescales	߬ଵ ≪ ߬௛~1	day.	
This	conclusion	also	sheds	 light	on	the	mechanics	of	(intraday)	news‐based	trading.	Analysts	take	
exogenous	news	flow	ߦ௧	as	an	input	to	generate	and	propagate	information	݄	in	time	~߬௛.	Once	݄	is	
released,	 the	 short‐term	 traders	 will	 move	 market	 price	 by	∆݌~∆ݏଵ	in	 time	~߬ଵ,	 i.e.	 with	 a	
practically	instantaneous	effect.	It	follows	that	the	objective	of	news‐based	trading	is	to	capture	this	
∆݌	by	estimating	݄	from	ߦ௧	before	݄	has	been	released.				
Model	 (5)	 states	 that	 this	 same	 release	 of	 information	݄	will	 cause	 further	 changes	 in	 price,	
namely	due	to	∆ݏଶ,	∆ݏଷ,	∆ݏସ	and	so	forth,	that	will	be	unfolding	over	days,	weeks	and	months.	In	this	
section,	we	aim	to	verify	this	statement	by	designing	and	testing	algorithmic	trading	strategies	that	
can	capture	these	longer‐term	impacts.	
Our	approach	 is	as	 follows.	 In	accordance	with	(5a)	and	(4),	price	changes	are	determined	by	
the	 sentiments	 of	 investor	 groups	 with	 different	 investment	 horizons,	 which	 contribute	 to	 the	
formation	 of	 aggregate	 market	 sentiment	 on	 different	 timescales.	 Thus,	 if	 we	 extract	 the	
characteristic	sentiment	dynamic	pertaining	to	each	group,	we	can	forecast	price	over	various	time	
horizons	and	implement	trades	based	upon	these	forecasts.	
We	 therefore	wish	 to	 capture	 the	 characteristic	dynamic	of	 each	 investor	group,	while	 taking	
into	account	the	influence	of	the	other	groups.	Then,	we	apply	this	dynamic	to	extrapolate	the	future	
market	position	from	its	current	position,	given	by	empirically	obtained	݄	and	ݏሺ݄ሻ,	and	so	generate	
return	forecast	over	the	relevant	horizon.	In	terms	of	the	motion	in	the	ሺܰ ൅ 1ሻ‐dimensional	phase	
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space	ሺ݄, ݏሻ,	this	means	investigating	the	characteristic	behavior	of	the	phase	trajectory	൫݄ሺݐሻ, ݏሺݐሻ൯	
projected	on	the	ሺ݄, ݏ௜ሻ‐plane,	subject	to	constraints	imposed	on	ݏ௜	by	ݏ௝ஷ௜.		
In	practice,	the	nine‐component	model	(5)	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28	business	days,	
studied	above,	has	been	applied	 to	produce	return	 forecasts	over	 time	horizons	corresponding	 to	
the	characteristic	timescales	in	the	model.	These	return	forecasts	can	form	the	basis	of	a	number	of	
trading	strategies,	four	of	which,	with	different	holding	periods,	are	presented	here.	Specifically,	we	
show	one	strategy	based	on	the	shortest	forecast,	two	strategies	based	on	different	combinations	of	
the	equally‐weighted	 forecasts	and	the	 last	strategy	based	on	 the	 longest	 forecast.	 In	 the	backtest	
results,	the	average	holding	periods	of	these	strategies	have	been,	respectively,	around	9,	12,	25	and	
45	business	days	(Table	I).	
Each	strategy	generates	daily	a	buy‐,	sell‐	or	hold	signal	on	the	SPDR	S&P	500	ETF	(Bloomberg	
ticker:	SPY)	(“SPY”),	an	exchange‐traded	fund	tracking	the	S&P	500	Index,	such	that	today’s	trading	
instruction	is	applied	to	the	next	day’s	opening	price.	The	signal	has	no	price	input:	it	is	based	solely	
on	the	forecast	derived	from	news.	We	emphasize	that	these	strategies	are	merely	crude	prototypes,	
designed	not	 for	actual	 trading	but	 to	verify	return	predictability;	as	such,	 these	strategies	do	not	
include	position	sizing	and	risk	management.		
We	 backtest	 these	 strategies	 over	 the	 period	 1995‐2015.	 Since	 the	 construction	 of	 strategies	
requires	 an	 in‐sample	 period	 of	 roughly	 2000	 business	 days	 for	 parameter	 value	 selection,	 the	
backtested	 performance	 is	 reported	 for	 the	 out‐sample	 period	 2003‐2015.	 We	 note	 that	 the	
strategies	are	not	sensitive	to	the	location	of	the	in‐sample	period	in	the	backtest	interval	and	that	
in‐sample	and	out‐sample	performance	statistics	are	similar.	The	backtested	results	are	compared	
with	 those	 of	 two	 benchmarks:	 a	 passive,	 long‐only	 investment	 in	 SPY	 and	 an	 active,	 long‐short	
strategy	that	combines	a	5‐day	reversal	and	250‐day	momentum	strategies	(“Mom‐Rev”)	applied	to	
SPY	over	this	same	period.		
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Figure	 (8)	and	Tables	 I	 and	 II	 show	 the	 cumulative	 returns,	performance	statistics	 and	 cross‐
correlations,	respectively.	
	
Figure	8:	Performance	graphs	of	four	algorithmic	news‐based	strategies	applied	to	SPY,	unadjusted	
for	 dividends,	 benchmarked	 against	 SPY	 and	Mom‐Rev	 (as	 defined	 above)	 during	 the	 out‐sample	
period	2003‐2015.	The	 invested	 capital,	 as	 a	base	 for	daily	P&L	accruals	 in	 active	 strategies,	was	
subject	to	a	requirement,	applied	on	the	in‐sample,	that	each	strategy	be	on	average	fully	invested	
during	the	periods	for	which	trading	signal	was	nonzero.	No	transaction	costs	were	applied.	Also,	no	
interest	and	no	funding	costs	were	accrued	on	the	under‐	and	overinvested	days,	respectively.	(a)	
Cumulative	non‐compounded	monthly	returns.	(b)	3‐year	rolling	returns.		
Table	I:	Statistics	based	on	monthly	returns		
		
Strategy	
1	
Strategy	
2	
Strategy	
3	
Strategy	
4	
Mom‐
Rev	 SPY	
Mean	return	(%,	p.a.)	 16.6	 17.1	 19.0	 17.0	 7.9	 7.7	
Volatility	(%,	p.a.)	 15.2	 15.5	 13.9	 13.9	 9.4	 14.6	
Max.	drawdown	(%,	monthly)	 ‐21.3	 ‐29.0	 ‐21.5	 ‐20.9	 ‐15.9	 ‐29.6	
5%‐VaR	(%,	monthly)	 ‐5.4	 ‐7.1	 ‐5.9	 ‐5.3	 ‐3.9	 ‐8.6	
Gross	exposure	to	SPY	(%)	 61	 72	 96	 100	 42	 100	
Alpha	 1.400	 1.228	 1.382	 1.348	 0.697	 0.000	
Beta	 0.011	 0.302	 0.319	 0.111	 ‐0.060	 1.000	
Sharpe	ratio*	(p.a.)	 0.97	 0.97	 1.23	 1.08	 0.62	 0.39	
Sortino	ratio*	(p.a.)	 0.91	 0.76	 1.15	 1.23	 0.56	 0.32	
Holding	period	(bus.	days)	 8.6	 12.0	 25.3	 44.6	 3.7	 n/a	
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	 *	The	risk	free	rate	in	the	Sharpe	ratio	and	the	Sortino	ratio	is	2.0%	p.a.	
	
Table	II:	Correlations	(%)	based	on	monthly	returns	
		 Strategy	1	 Strategy	2	 Strategy	3	 Strategy	4	 Mom‐Rev	 SPY	
Strategy	1	 100	 79 62 33 24 1	
Strategy	2	 100 83 45 17 29	
Strategy	3	 100 64 20 33	
Strategy	4	 100 7 12	
Mom‐Rev	 100 ‐9	
SPY	 	 	 100	
	
The	pro‐forma	returns	of	all	four	news‐based	strategies	have	exceeded	the	returns	of	the	equity	
index	and	the	priced‐based	momentum‐reversal	strategy,	on	absolute‐	and	risk‐adjusted	bases,	and	
have	also	exhibited	a	relatively	 low	correlation	with	these	benchmarks	on	the	12‐year	out‐sample	
period.	 Note	 that	 the	 lengths	 of	 the	 average	 holding	 periods	 of	 these	 strategies	 are	 substantially	
longer	 than	 that	 of	 the	 active	 benchmark.	 These	 results	 point	 toward	 return	 predictability	 on	
timescales	 longer	 than	 intraday	 and	 indicate	 that	 the	model	 has,	 at	 least	 partially,	 captured	 this	
predictability.		
It	had	been	intended	that	this	section	would	end	with	the	sentence	above.	However,	following	
the	completion	of	this	paper,	we	were	able	to	substantially	enhance	the	forecast	precision	in	certain	
market	regimes	and,	using	these	forecasts,	develop	an	algorithmic	news‐based	strategy	sufficiently	
robust	for	implementation.	We	launched	this	trading	strategy	on	October	23,	2015,	with	Interactive	
Brokers,	an	online	broker,	with	the	objective	to	test	the	model	predictability	 in	actual	trading.	We	
briefly	describe	this	strategy,	including	the	backtested	results,	in	the	following	paragraphs.	
The	strategy	has	no	price	inputs,	such	as	stop‐losses,	volatility‐scaled	exposure	or	other	price‐
dependent	features.	The	daily	trading	signal	is	derived	solely	from	news	and	the	principles	set	out	
in	 the	present	paper	and	 is	applied	 to	 trade	SPY	at	 the	next	day’s	opening	price.	The	 (pro‐forma)	
average	holding	period	is	about	8	business	days.	The	exposure	to	SPY	is	a	function	of	the	forecast	
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probability,	taking	any	values	between	‐175%	and	+175%.	In	the	backtest,	the	strategy	displayed	on	
average	a	92%	gross	exposure	to	SPY.		
Figure	9	shows	the	strategy’s	pro‐forma	cumulative	returns	and	performance	statistics,	subject	
to	an	0.80%	p.a.	cost	drag,	consistent	with	the	transaction	costs	currently	incurred	by	this	strategy	
in	actual	trading.	The	strategy	has	been	tracked	against	the	passive	benchmark	(SPY)	and	the	active	
benchmark	(Mom‐Rev),	defined	above.	The	out‐sample	results	are	as	follows:	The	strategy	is	more	
aggressive	than	the	benchmarks,	since	it	has	exhibited	a	25.1%	annual	volatility	vs	SPY’s	14.6%	and	
Mom‐Rev’s	9.5%.	However,	its	downside	risk	is	below	or	comparable	with	that	of	the	benchmarks,	
as	measured	by	the	monthly	5%‐VaR	of	‐4.7%	vs	SPY’s	‐8.2%	and	Mom‐Rev’s	‐4.0%	and	the	worst	
monthly	drawdown	of	‐14.4%	vs	SPY’s	‐29.6%	and	Mom‐Rev’s	‐15.9%.	The	strategy	has	performed	
on	a	risk‐adjusted	basis	better	 than	both	benchmarks,	with	 the	Sharpe	ratio	of	1.07	vs	SPY’s	0.31	
and	Mom‐Rev’s	0.47	and,	especially,	with	the	Sortino	ratio	of	2.52	vs	SPY’s	0.26	and	Mom‐Rev’s	0.43.	
It	 has	 demonstrated	 an	 equally	 strong	 outperformance	 on	 an	 absolute	 return	 basis,	 as	 is	 evident	
from	the	graphs.	These	results	lend	further	credence	to	the	market	model	studied	here	and	warrant	
further	research	on	its	applications	to	market	prediction,	including	actual	trading.	
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Figure	9:	Backtested	performance	of	the	implemented	news‐based	strategy	(traded	since	10/2015)	
benchmarked	 against	 SPY	 and	 Mom‐Rev,	 defined	 above,	 during	 10/1995‐01/2016.	 The	 strategy	
signal	 and	 the	active	benchmark	 (Mom‐Rev)	 signal	are	 applied	 to	 the	next	day’s	opening	price	of	
SPY,	unadjusted	for	dividends.	The	figure	offers	the	graphs	of	cumulative	non‐compounded	monthly	
returns,	as	well	as	the	summary	out‐sample	statistics	for	the	news‐based	strategy	in	the	embedded	
table	(the	Sharpe	and	Sortino	ratios	are	calculated	with	a	2.0%	p.a.	risk‐free	rate).		
4.	Discussion		
The	starting	point	for	this	paper	was	the	agent‐based	stock	market	model	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	The	
model	 consists	of	 analysts29,	who	extract	 relevant	 information	 from	price	 changes	and	exogenous	
news,	and	investors,	who	apply	this	information	to	trade.	The	interaction	mode	among	the	agents	is	
assumed	 to	 be	 all‐to‐all	 to	 derive	 the	 model	 equations	 in	 analytic	 form	 as	 a	 dynamical	 system	
governing	the	evolution	of	the	mutually‐coupled	endogenous	“macroscopic”	variables:	market	price	
(݌),	investor	sentiment	(ݏ)	and	information	(݄)	supplied	by	analysts	(equations	1).		
This	homogeneous	 interaction	 topology,	assumed	 in	 the	model,	 is	 instrumental	 for	 identifying	
the	basic	mechanisms	that	drive	market	dynamics;	however	it	also	makes	the	model	 insufficiently	
fine‐grained	 for	 testing	return	predictability.	An	 introduction	of	a	more	complex	topology	 is	not	a	
straightforward	 task	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 obvious	 choices	 and	 because	 of	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 model’s	
properties	to	these	choices..	
																																																													
29	This	term	is	applied	in	a	collective	sense,	comprising	financial	analysts,	newspaper	journalists,	market	
commentators,	 finance	bloggers	and	other	participants	who	communicate	 their	market	views	through	mass	
media.	
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We	sidestepped	this	problem	by	arranging	investors	in	peer	networks,	according	to	investment	
horizons,	on	the	assumption	that	interaction	among	peers	is	strongest,	obtaining	in	the	limiting	case	
the	 all‐to‐all	 interaction	 within	 each	 peer	 network	 and	 zero	 outside	 interaction	 (Section	 1.2).	
Despite	 the	 absence	 of	 interaction	 across	 the	 networks,	 each	 still	 can	 impact	 the	 others	 by	
contributing	 to	 the	 common	 information	 flow	 that	 affects	 all	 networks	 in	 equal	 measure.	 This	
phenomenological	 approach	 has	 enabled	 us	 to	 derive	 a	 heterogeneous	 model	 with	ܰ	investor	
networks	or	groups	(equations	5),	which	is	sufficiently	realistic	to	be	applied	for	return	prediction	
and	yet	simple	enough	to	be	expressed	in	analytic	form.	
In	particular,	this	model	demonstrates	that	with	respect	to	processing	 information	the	market	
behaves	quasi‐efficiently	on	intraday	timescales	(Section	2.4)	and	inefficiently	on	timescales	longer	
than	one	day	(Sections	2.2‐2.3).	The	model	equations	reveal	that	 it	 is	price	feedback	that	enforces	
market	 inefficiency	 by	 coupling	 the	 endogenous	 variables.	 We	 have	 shown	 that	 feedback	 is	
negligible	on	the	intraday	scale,	but	is	important	over	longer	time	horizons,	where	it	contributes	to	
leading‐order	dynamics.			
The	situation	where	a	system	exhibits	different	behaviors	on	different	scales	 is	not	unusual	 in	
nature.	 Fluid	 dynamics	 provides	 an	 instructive	 example.	 In	 fluids,	 inertia	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 on	
large	 scales,	 while	 viscous	 damping	 is	 dominant	 on	 small	 scales.30	As	 a	 result,	 the	 large‐scale	
dynamics	 and	 the	 small‐scale	 dynamics	 are	 fundamentally	 different:	 inertia	 induces	 a	 nonlinear	
																																																													
30	For	example,	we	swim	by	using	water’s	resistance	to	create	momentum;	however	this	strategy	would	
fail	if	we	were	the	size	of	bacteria:	for	microorganisms,	water	appears	as	viscous	as	honey	for	humans,	forcing	
them	to	evolve	unique	propulsion	techniques,	such	as	corkscrew‐like	locomotion	mechanisms	among	others.	
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endogenous	dynamic	at	macro	scales,	whereas	at	micro	scales	inertia	is	so	small	that	velocities	in	a	
fluid’s	flow	adjust	immediately	to	exogenous	changes,	leading	to	a	state	of	adiabatic	equilibrium.		
The	above	example	presents	a	useful	analogy	for	market	dynamics	as	the	market	also	evolves	on	
many	 (time)scales,	driven	by	participants	with	various	 investment	horizons.	 Indeed,	equation	 (7)	
implies	 that	 the	 investment	 horizon	߬௜	is	 analogous	 to	 the	 mass	 of	 the	݅‐th	 investor	 group’s	
sentiment	in	the	context	of	sentiment	dynamics.	Accordingly,	the	contribution	of	inertia	to	dynamics	
on	short	 timescales	 is	negligible	because	 the	mass	of	 the	sentiment	of	relevant	 investor	groups	 is	
very	 small:	 these	 investors	 react	 so	 fast	 as	 to	move	prices	 almost	 instantaneously	 in	 response	 to	
new	information,	leading	to	an	(adiabatic)	equilibrium	regime	on	these	timescales	(Section	2.4).	On	
the	contrary,	inertia	cannot	be	neglected	on	longer	timescales,	which	results	in	effective	interaction	
between	investors	and	analysts	in	the	model,	yielding	complex	dynamics	characterized	by	nonlinear	
feedback	(Sections	2.2‐2.3).		
The	 intraday	market	efficiency	does	not	 imply	the	 lack	of	short‐term	trading	opportunities.	 In	
fact,	whereas	price	adjusts	instantaneously,	information	݄	is	released	by	analysts	on	average	on	the	
scale	߬௛~1	day.	This	delay,	which	can	likely	be	attributed	to	information	processing	(e.g.	gathering,	
aggregation,	 analysis,	 editing)	 and	 distribution	 frequency,	 creates	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 for	
intraday	trading	between	the	occurrence	of	a	news	event	(e.g.	the	release	of	an	earnings	report)	and	
its	reflection	in	݄.		
This	 short‐term	price	 reaction	 to	 information	 released	 by	 analysts	 is	 incomplete	 because	 the	
overall	market	 sentiment	also	 includes	 the	 sentiments	of	 investor	 groups	with	 longer	 investment	
horizons,	which	 can	 influence	 the	mid‐	 and	 long‐term	 price	 evolution.	 Equations	 (6)	 state	 that	 a	
change	in	information	will	cause	changes	in	sentiment	on	many	different	timescales	and	that	these	
changes	will	 in	turn	cause	changes	 in	 information	–	creating	a	 feedback	 loop.	This	complex	multi‐
scale	 interplay	 between	 information	 and	 sentiment	 is	 the	 generator	 of	 the	 variety	 in	 market	
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behavior,	 including	 self‐similar	 variation	 patterns	 briefly	 explained	 as	 a	 synchronization	 effect	 in	
Sections	2.1‐2.3.		
In	addition,	the	market	is	subject	to	the	impact	of	exogenous	news	flow	that	acts	as	an	external	
stochastic	driving	force	(equations	5).	However,	as	discussed	above,	on	long	timescales	the	market	
acquires	inertia	and	with	it	a	resistance	to	change	in	direction.	As	a	result,	market	behavior	can	be	
predictable	in	situations	where	inertia	outweighs	noise.	A	test	of	this	predictability	has	been	carried	
out	in	Section	3.	
Our	approach	to	return	prediction	is	based	on	principles	similar	to	those	of	weather	forecasting,	
i.e.	 combining	 theoretical	 models	 and	 empirical	 measurements.	 We	 have	 obtained	 the	 empirical	
time	series	of	information	(Section	2.3)	and	applied	model	(5)	to	forecast	sentiment	and	price	and,	
based	on	 these	 forecasts,	develop	 the	prototypes	of	 trading	strategies	(Section	3).	The	backtested	
results,	compared	to	passive	and	active	benchmarks,	suggest	that	market	forecasting	on	the	above‐
described	principles	functions	with	a	precision	sufficient	for	the	development	and	implementation	
of	successful	news‐based	trading	strategies	operating	over	horizons	ranging	from	days	to	months.		
We	have	 sought	 to	produce	a	market	model	 that	 is	 sufficiently	sophisticated	 to	both	 replicate	
past	 performance	 and	 predict	 future	 returns,	 while	 being	 tractable	 to	 highlight	 the	 essential	
mechanisms	underlying	market	dynamics.	We	fully	realize	that	the	range	of	processes	occurring	in	
the	market	is	substantially	broader	than	those	captured	by	this	model.	For	example,	the	model	does	
not	 include	 fundamental	 traders	 (who	 apply	 financial	 analysis)	 and	 systematic	 traders	 (who	 use	
price	data).	We	note,	however,	that	the	analysts	in	the	model	perform	analogous	functions,	so	that,	
in	the	first	order,	the	impacts	due	to	these	two	types	of	investors	have	been	taken	into	account.	In	
any	case,	 this	 is	work	 in	progress	–	modeling	necessarily	proceeds	from	simple	to	complex	as	the	
grasp	 of	 underlying	 mechanisms	 improves	 –	 the	 objective	 of	 which	 is	 to	 advance	 the	 current	
knowledge	of	market	dynamics	and	provide	a	basis	for	further	modeling	efforts.	
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We	would	 like	 to	 conclude	 this	 section	by	 referencing	Farmer	 (2001)	who	argued	 that	agent‐
based	models	had	the	potential	to	give	practitioners	better	tools	to	predict	markets	but	noted	that	
“the	advent	of	practical	agent‐based	models	 is	still	at	 least	several	years	away”.	To	the	best	of	our	
knowledge,	the	news‐driven	model	of	stock	market	dynamics	developed	in	the	present	paper	is	the	
first	such	practical	agent‐based	model.	
5.	Conclusion	
In	this	paper	we	have	theoretically	and	empirically	investigated	stock	market	return	predictability	
on	 various	 time	 horizons.	 In	 particular,	we	 introduced	 a	 news‐driven	model	with	 heterogeneous	
investors	and,	using	this	model,	developed	and	backtested	purely	news‐based,	algorithmic	trading	
strategies.	In	the	course	of	this	study	we	have	reached	the	following	conclusions:	
1. There	exist	two	characteristic	timescales	of	stock	market	dynamics.	Over	time	horizons	shorter	
than	one	day,	 the	market	behaves	quasi‐efficiently	with	respect	 to	processing	 information.	On	
time	horizons	longer	than	one	day,	the	market	becomes	inefficient.	
2. This	 informational	 inefficiency	 is	 caused	 by	 a	 feedback	 loop,	which	 acts	 on	 timescales	 longer	
than	one	day,	 interconnecting	 information,	opinion	and	price	and	giving	rise	to	 fundamentally	
nonlinear	overall	dynamics.			
3. On	these	timescales,	the	relevant	model	for	market	dynamics	is	a	dynamical	system	governing	
the	evolution	of	mutually‐coupled	information,	opinion	and	price,	driven	by	exogenous	news.		
4. According	to	this	model,	 the	sentiments	of	 investor	groups	with	different	 investment	horizons	
collectively	 form	 aggregate	 investor	 opinion	 that	 determines	 a	 price	 dynamic,	 which	 in	 turn	
influences	information	flow	acting	on	all	groups	participating	in	the	market.		
5. This	common	information	flow	provides	a	link	through	which	the	sentiments	of	investor	groups	
are	 mutually	 coupled.	 As	 such,	 information	 induces	 self‐similar	 dynamics	 among	 investor	
groups	on	multiple	timescales	through	synchronization,	leading	to	complex	self‐similar	patterns	
observable	in	market	behavior.		
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6. These	 investor	 groups	 form	 two	 classes	 characterized	 by	 distinct	 dynamics.	 The	 first	 class	
contains	 investors	 with	 horizons	 less	 than	 one	 week.	 Their	 average	 sentiments	 are	 volatile,	
typically	 changing	 from	 negative	 to	 positive	 or	 vice	 versa	 in	 the	 timeframe	 from	 one	 to	 four	
weeks.	The	second	class	consists	of	investors	with	horizons	exceeding	one	week.	Their	average	
sentiments	normally	undergo	small‐amplitude	oscillations	around	either	a	positive	or	negative	
equilibrium,	where	the	consensus	of	opinion	is	reached.			
7. The	 regime	 change	 between	 bull‐	 and	 bear	 markets	 takes	 place	 when	 investors	 with	 long	
investment	horizons	transit	from	one	sentiment	equilibrium	to	the	other.	This	transition	occurs	
as	a	cascade,	whereby	investors	with	longer	horizons	follow,	one‐by‐one,	investors	with	shorter	
horizons.	
8. The	backtested	results	of	the	prototypes	of	trading	strategies,	designed	by	blending	a	theoretical	
agent‐based	 model	 (dynamical	 system)	 with	 empirical	 observations	 (news	 data)	 for	 trading	
over	time	horizons	that	range	from	days	to	months,	suggest	that	the	stock	market	dynamics	are	
to	a	certain	extent	predictable.		
9. Having	provided	theoretical	and	empirical	evidence	for	market	predictability	in	this	paper,	it	is	
our	future	research	objective	to	test	this	predictability	in	actual	trading.	In	the	end	of	Section	3,	
we	briefly	reported	the	pro‐forma	risk‐return	characteristics	of	the	news‐based	strategy	that	we	
have	recently	launched	to	initiate	such	a	test.	This	strategy	is	currently	trading	only	the	US	stock	
market.	 Our	 next	 steps	 include	 extending	 it	 to	 other	 equity	markets	 and,	 potentially,	 also	 to	
commodity	markets.	
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Appendix	A:	Approximation	of	the	dynamical	system	
Here	we	express	the	dynamical	system	(6)	as	a	system	of	forced,	coupled,	nonlinear	oscillators.31	We	
differentiate	equation	(6a)	with	respect	to	time	and	use	equation	(6b)	to	obtain	
߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൌ ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ
ൌ െݏሶ௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻଶሻ ൬ߚଵݏሶ௜ ൅ ߚଵ߬௛ ݏ௜ െ
1
߬௛ arctanhሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻ൰
൅ ሺ1 െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻଶሻ ߚଶ߬௛ tanhሺߛݏሶ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ ,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																									ሺܣ1ሻ	
where	ݏ ൌ ∑ఛ೔௦೔∑ ఛ೔ 		in	accordance	with	(4).		
These	equations	govern	the	motion	of	ܰ	oscillators	–	that	is	ܰ	particles	with	the	coordinates	ݏ௜	
and	the	velocities	ݏሶ௜ ,	subjected	to	the	force	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ.	Note	that	߬௜	is	analogous	to	the	mass	of	the	
݅‐th	particle	in	the	sense	that	the	impact	of	a	force	on	the	particles	with	small	߬௜	(“light”	particles)	is	
greater	than	on	the	particles	with	large	߬௜	(“heavy”	particles).	In	other	words,	“light”	particles	have	
small	inertia	and	“heavy”	particles	have	large	inertia.		
																																																													
31	We	follow	the	steps	of	a	similar	derivation	for	ܰ ൌ 1	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	(Appendix	C).	That	appendix	
also	 provides	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 phase	 portrait	 geometry,	 including	 the	 bifurcations	 of	 equilibrium	
points	and	the	formation	of	a	stable	limit	cycle.			
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The	 first	 two	 terms	 in	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	contain	 the	 restoring	 and	 damping	 force	 components	
responsible	for	autonomous	dynamics.	The	third	term	describes	the	force	originating	from	the	݅‐th	
sentiment	 component	 feedback	 (~ߛ߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	~ߜ)	 and	 the	 external	 forces	 exerted	 by	 the	 other	
particles	(~ߛ ∑ ௝߬ݏሶ௝௝ஷ௜ )	and	by	the	flow	of	exogenous	news	(~ߢߦ௧)	in	the	argument	of	the	hyperbolic	
tangent.	Being	dependent	on	position	and	velocity,	these	forces	vary	along	a	particle’s	trajectory.			
For	illustration	purposes,	we	expand	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	into	a	truncated	Taylor	series	to	separate	the	
above‐mentioned	force	components	and	write	equation	(A1)	in	a	canonical	form:	
߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൅ ܩሺݏ௜ሻݏሶ௜ ൅ ܷ݀
ሺݏ௜ሻ
݀ݏ௜ ൌ ܨ௜
௖ ൅ ܨ௘,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ.																																																																																							ሺܣ2ሻ	
In	 this	 equation,	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	has	 the	meaning	 of	 a	 potential	 and	 is	 given	with	 the	 precision	 up	 to	 a	
constant	by	
ܷሺݏ௜ሻ ൌ 1߬௛ ቌ
ߚଵ െ 23
4 ݏ௜
ସ െ ߚଵ െ 12 ݏ௜
ଶ െ ߚଶߜݏ௜ቍ ;																																																																																															ሺܣ3ሻ	
ܩሺݏ௜ሻ	has	the	meaning	of	a	damping	coefficient	and	is	given	by		
ܩሺݏ௜ሻ 	ൌ ൬1 െ ߚଵ െ ߚଶ̅ߛ ߬௜߬௛ ൅
߬௜
߬௛൰ ൅ 2ߚଶ
߬௜
߬௛ ߜݏ௜ ൅ ൬ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ̅ߛ
߬௜
߬௛ ൅ 2ሺߚଵ െ 1ሻ
߬௜
߬௛൰ ݏ௜
ଶ; 																													ሺܣ4ሻ	
where		
̅ߛ ൌ ߛ∑ ߬௜ ;	
ܨ௜௖	has	the	meaning	of	an	external	force	exerted	by	the	other	particles	and	is	given	by	
ܨ௜௖ ൌ
ߚଶ̅ߛ
߬௛ ෍ ௝߬ݏሶ௝௝ஷ௜
; 																																																																																																																																																					ሺܣ5ሻ	
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and	ܨ௘	has	the	meaning	of	an	external	force	due	to	the	flow	of	exogenous	news	and	is	given	by	
ܨ௘ ൌ ߚଶ߬௛ ߢߦ௧.																																																																																																																																																																	ሺܣ6ሻ	
As	 such,	 equation	 (A2)	 describes	 the	 motion	 of	 a	 particle	 inside	 an	 asymmetric	 double‐well	
potential	well	(A3)	for	ߚଵ ൐ 1	(see	Figure	1)	in	the	presence	of	nonlinear	damping	(A4),	driven	by	
the	 forces	 generated	 through	 interaction	 between	 particles	 (A5)	 and	 through	 the	 impact	 of	
exogenous	news	 (A6).	Note	 that	 the	 feedback	 force	 in	 (A1),	 proportional	 to	̅ߛ߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	ߜ,	 has	 been	
incorporated	into	both	the	potential	 force	(only	the	component	~ߜ)	and	the	damping	force	on	the	
left‐hand	side	of	(A2).	
To	 obtain	 equations	 (A2)‐(A6),	 we	 have	 truncated	 the	 Taylor	 series	 of	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	at	 terms	
above	cubic	in	ݏ௜,	linear	in	ݏሶ௜	and	linear	in	ߜ	and	have	kept	only	the	leading	terms	in	the	expressions	
for	 the	 forces	ܨ௜௖	and	ܨ௘.	 Consequently,	 these	 equations	 are,	 strictly	 speaking,	 only	 valid	 in	 the	
region	 where	|ݏ௜| ≪ 1	and	|ݏሶ௜| ≪ 1.	 However,	 we	 expect	 that	 the	 formula	 for	 the	 potential	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ,	
which	 does	 not	 contain	 the	 heavily	 truncated	 terms	~ݏሶ௜ ,	 holds	 reasonably	 well	 for	 all	 sentiment	
values	(|ݏ௜| ൑ 1)	within	the	relevant	range	of	parameter	values,	that	is	ߚଵ~1, ߚଶ~1	and	ߜ ≪ 1.		
As	follows	from	(A4),	the	damping	coefficient	ܩሺݏ௜ሻ	is	negative	if		
̅ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ௖ሺݏ௜, ߬௜ሻ ൌ
ቀ1 െ ߚଵ ൅ ߬௜߬௛ቁ ൅ 2ߚଶ
߬௜߬௛ ߜݏ௜ ൅ ቀߚଵ ൅ 2ሺߚଵ െ 1ሻ
߬௜߬௛ቁ ݏ௜
ଶ
ߚଶ ߬௜߬௛ ሺ1 െ ݏ௜
ଶሻ .																																																			ሺܣ7ሻ	
Condition	(A7)	means	 that	 for	sufficiently	 large	̅ߛ	there	are	regions	where	energy	 in	 the	system	 is	
amplified	(negative	damping),	pointing	toward	the	possibility	of	a	limit	cycle.	Because	this	condition	
has	 been	 derived	 for	|ݏ௜| ≪ 1	and	ߜ ≪ 1,	 we	 can	 in	 the	 leading	 order	 neglect	 the	 terms	~ߜݏ௜	and	
~ݏ௜ଶ	to	obtain			
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ߛ ൐ ߛ௖ሺ߬௜ሻ ൌ
1 െ ሺߚଵ െ 1ሻ ߬௛߬௜
ߚଶ ෍߬௜ .																																																																																																																					ሺܣ8ሻ	
Since	ߚଵ~1	(we	use	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1),	 the	 second	 term	 in	 the	numerator	 in	 (A8)	 is	much	 smaller	 than	
unity	 for	 particles	 with	߬௜ ൒ ߬௛	(we	 set	߬௛ ൌ 1	day)	 and	 can	 be	 neglected.	 This	 means	 that	ߛ௖	has	
approximately	the	same	value	for	all	investors	with	investment	horizons	equal	to	or	longer	than	one	
day,	given	by	
ߛ௖ ൌ 1ߚଶ෍߬௜ .																																																																																																																																																													ሺܣ9ሻ	
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